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Islamic Notable Views Role of Islam in Secular State

44040175 Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
8 Mar 88 pp 16-19

[Interview with Mr Kamil al-Sharif, well-known Islamic personality and former minister in Jordan by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi: "A Meeting with Kamil al-Sharif at the Forum of Ideas; National Regimes in Islamic Countries Must Maintain Realistic and Profound View of the Ideological Aspect;" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Mr Kamil al-Sharif, who is a well-known Islamic personality in the Arab and Islamic world, is also a former minister in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. His experience has been far-reaching, and his opinion on the relationship between national regimes and Islamic movements is worth noting. AL-MUJTAMA' met with Mr al-Sharif at its forum, and it discussed with him a subject of a special nature. The subject was dictated by current Islamic circumstances, by the circumstances of Islamic missionary activity, and by the circumstances of Islamic missionaries in the age of Islamic awakening. Iran is trying to influence the course of this awakening, particularly among young Muslims outside the Arab world.

AL-MUJTAMA' discussed this question with Mr Kamil al-Sharif. It reviewed with him possible prospects for cooperation between moderate regimes and Islamic movements to confront the dangers resulting from Iranian tactics.

AL-MUJTAMA' discussed that at its forum in accordance with the following topics:

Components of the Relationship Between Muslims and Governments

[Question] At the seminar on the Islamic awakening which was held in Amman last March, questions and fundamental issues were raised about the attitudes of national governments toward the Islamic awakening. Among those questions were some which had to do with the fears some people have about the Islamic awakening and the program some regimes have outlined to take advantage of it. Another question had to do with the apprehension felt by those involved in the Islamic awakening toward regimes. These questions which remain unanswered were posed to some thinkers who are engaged in an attempt to build relationships between good, national regimes and promoters of this true, Islamic religion. Do you think there are ingredients which are good enough to be used to build that relationship between those who are involved in the Islamic awakening and in Islamic movements and those who are members of moderate regimes on the Arab scene?

[Answer] Actually, the relationship I envision may be summarized in a few words.

The two parties must show mutual appreciation of each other's circumstances and conditions. We must reach a stage of appreciation whereby Arab regimes realize that Islamic aspirations in the region are legitimate. We must reach the stage where Arab regimes realize that enormous challenges in all political, economic, and military areas to which every part of our region is being subjected are forcing Islamic peoples to look for an impregnable, radical line of defense to fend off these attacks. Whatever angle they take, people end up relying on the Islamic course to resist this danger. This is a fact to which the history of this region attests. Any probing, careful examination of all the factors surrounding the Islamic peoples will also attest to that.

In return, leaders of the Islamic awakening must also appreciate those factors which presently dominate the local and international situation. This is because people sometimes see life through their hopes and aspirations; thus, they see life without an adequate measure of realism. It is an indisputable fact that Arab regimes live under specific international pressures and in accordance with specific cultures and specific barriers because regimes are made up of individuals. All such contradictions create that gap. If we assume that governments in general have recognized these aspirations and have accepted their importance, their feasibility and their true meaning, and if, on the other hand, leaders and main figures of the Islamic awakening have recognized the true circumstances which governments are experiencing locally and internationally, that mutual appreciation might reduce the vehemence of the clash and might create at least a modest beginning in the quest for an Islamic way. That might create acceptance for a reasonable and proper measure of Islamic reforms. [And that would be good] even if that course were to take a long time. What matters is that the road become clear and its landmarks distinguishable and agreed upon regardless of the time that will be required to travel on that road. I do not think time is of primary importance, but what is important is the clear visibility of the road. What is important is accepting that road and proceeding on it. Then, Muslims would certainly be better off if they were to take 50 years to achieve what they might have hoped to achieve in 10, provided they do so without convulsions, violence and disturbances.

As I said, however, this is naturally what is being hoped for now, but there are, of course, obstacles blocking that hope and facts standing in the way. This includes the fact that, as we said, Islamic movements are derived directly from the source of Islamic ideas and dogma. Their slogan is that a Muslim must accept everything or reject everything. That slogan sounded good, but it is one we must reconsider carefully. If factors were sometimes unfavorable or unhelpful, I fear that Muslims will find it easier to reject rather than accept everything. We may then find ourselves in a predicament which we feel does exist now.

Iran and Attempts To Take Advantage of the Awakening

[Question] Iran is trying to take advantage of the emotions of young, Arab and non-Arab Muslims in numerous locations throughout the world. This is most evident in Europe and Africa. Based on that situation, there are those who believe that giving concrete form to the relationship between regimes and the Islamic movement is necessary so that Iran's tactics can be confronted. Iran's aim is to use the Islamic awakening to serve its own interest. Iran wants to corrupt young Muslims and make them seek the goals it wants. What do you have to say about this matter?

[Answer] The Iranian Revolution is undoubtedly by Shi'ite standards an Islamic Revolution. If we were to say it was contrived or calculated, we would not be fair, and we would be expressing an illusion rather than the facts. The Iranian Revolution has undoubtedly rocked the area considerably. It disturbed the balances in the world and attracted attention to Islam. In some cases that attention was harmful because this revolution did not always express itself in a pure, proper, and useful manner. I believe that the absence of a strong, cohesive Islamic entity that relies on proper beliefs to counter the Iranian Revolution, to establish a balanced view and to attract young people to it is responsible for the influence the Iranian Revolution exercises in the Islamic world and the attention it gets from young people and some movements, especially in Africa. But some governments are doing the opposite: they are making mistakes which are helping the Iranian attack in the region. Thus, I believe that when people are persecuted in some Islamic countries and when Islamic values and principles are directly and blatantly challenged, the Islamic attack in the region gets a shot in the arm. That is why Iran must not be viewed from a geopolitical and military standpoint only; instead, it must also be viewed from a purely ideological standpoint. Iranians are people who wish to return to an Islamic way and an Islamic life because, as we said, of the crucial challenges and tests which the region is going through. These tests and challenges are affecting the region's being, existence and beliefs. Thus, the people's enthusiasm for Islam is legitimate and proper. I fear that unless proper Islam is offered, an adulterated version will be accepted by young people. This, therefore, is our recommendation to national regimes in Islamic countries: Be realistic and scrutinize the articles of faith carefully. That would protect the people's faith, and it would protect young people from corruption. It would enable them to realize their hopes and aspirations in the proper way.

The Islamic Movement and the Confrontation

[Question] In an interview we had with the learned al-Shaykh Abu al-Hasan al-Nadwi, al-Shaykh al-Nadwi said that only a movement can confront the regime in Iran, which was born out of a movement. Today, the Islamic Movement is actually facing the intellectual,

cultural and ideological challenges that were created by the Iranian Revolution. What is being said to guide young Muslims to the right path and to protect the identity of their proper Islamic culture in the face of the aforementioned challenges?

[Answer] What Professor al-Nadwi said is 100 percent correct. But it may also be wrong for an Islamic movement to rise against Iran. That could become some kind of defeat from within. We are the ones who have been saying that the Iranian movement at first borrowed ideas from Islamic movements led by Sunnis. The symbols and literature of its early stages were Sunni. What happened, however, is that for different reasons these Islamic movements were either impeded or vanquished. The Iranian Revolution then adopted a purely local approach. I myself was one of those people who was given an opportunity to talk with Iranians during the early stages of the revolution. I talked with them even before the revolution when their leaders were in Paris. At first we felt that the movement was a general Islamic movement qualified to serve Islam in general. However, factors emerging inside Iran, within the region, or on the international scene diverted the Iranian Revolution from its earlier course which a lot of people had placed their hopes on. That is why I believe that the creation of Islamic movements in an atmosphere of freedom, understanding, and awareness would be beneficial. Such movements may be more capable of engaging Iran in a dialogue and making it see the dangers which have beset the area and which are hurling Iran itself and its neighbors toward the precipice.

Iran wants to appear as the sole protector of Islam and the Islamic heritage. We must recognize that although that claim is, of course, false, it is one that, as I said, Iranian leaders are tempted to make because of the vacuum that surrounds the area. Nor must we forget that history has always shown that the aim of any power emerging in Iran or elsewhere in the world has been to fill the vacuum around it promptly. That is what is feared; it is what happened in the past in the days of the Safawids, Cambyses, Cyrus and Nebuchadnezzar. One senses that it is feared that Iran ought not to move in a vacuum and that Arab and Islamic countries ought to embrace proper Islam and fill that vacuum with the proper, living faith. As I said, the intention here is not to declare war against Iran. After all, Iran is a part of this region, and neither Arabs nor Iranians can be removed from it. We are destined to remain neighbors. But Iran's leaders might return to reason if they feel that this region has become immune and fortified by proper beliefs. Iran's leaders might return to reason if they feel that the region is no longer "fair game," an area that can be bought and sold and subject to political exploitation. That might help bring about a rational approach in Iran. It might promote a serious, positive dialogue which could remove those dangers and remove as well the phantom of every kind of international intervention. If these dangers and interventions continue, they could turn into major dangers. Of course we do not forget that what is happening

between Iran and Iraq in this region has given a broad opportunity to Zionism, which we consider the first and primary source of conflict in this region. All such sources of conflict must be removed, and Arabs and Muslims must devote themselves to their elimination because they constitute a direct threat to beliefs and sacred objects and everything Muslims hold dear to their lives and their being.

Muslims and Participation in Government

[Question] It's been noticed that some Muslims are apprehensive sometimes about sharing power. Do you believe this is an individual position or a collective one? Doesn't the Islamic Movement want to share power? If not, why not?

[Answer] There are, of course, different reasons and causes for that; some of them have to do with Islamic education itself. Young people in Islamic movements learn an idealism that is absolute, and they see a bright, flawless picture of how things were like during the days of the orthodox caliphs. Naturally, when this picture is compared to our present situation, the disparity appears to be considerable, and man appears to be bewildered by it and to blame himself for it. That is one of the factors behind Muslims' apparent reluctance to share power. Another may be the discomfort felt by those who committed themselves to a specific, ideal standard after they had the experience of being in government, after they sensed the responsibilities involved therein, and after they sensed the possibility of having to make periodic and substantive concessions. Some movements also ended up by making independent judgments and fearing that if they were to rule in the name of Islam and then fail to carry out Islamic laws as they saw them, they would have sacrificed the faith, demonstrated its failure, and burdened it with more than it could bear.

I believe that none of these ideas is precise; maybe none of them is accurate. If an Islamic power had been on the scene, Islamic movements would not be necessary. But since that is not the case, Islamic movements must start at the beginning. They must help society develop so it can accept Islam. The process of social change is complicated, lengthy, and full of problems. That is why I believe that he who agrees to share power, embark on this adventure, and attempt to turn society toward Islam should be considered a well-intentioned leader who is trying to make an effort. If we were to look around, we would find that the few who did embark on such an adventure did not meet with total failure. Some of them did have an impact on societies. As I said, this social change requires power sharing because, at least in some countries, a sharp and direct surge in Islam would be difficult. We have to choose the road to slow reform. If we accept that, we must also accept sharing power, and that in time would grow and have an effect that would continue until society is restored to its Islamic character. I think that is the meaning of what the prophet, may God

bless him and grant him salvation, said: "Islam is wondrous and extraordinary at the outset, and it is wondrous and extraordinary when it returns." The wondrousness here is not that which is encountered at the end, but that which is encountered at the beginning.

A Lesson From Civil Strife

[Question] The Iranian civil strife which occurred during the days of the pilgrimage in Mecca attracted attention and alerted the world to what Iran might do in the future against the region and against those objects which Sunnis hold sacred and want to protect and preserve. This civil strife proved that the desire for agreement among some regimes in the region and Islamic advocates in general is considerable. Since we are facing many dangers now, including the danger from Iran, how can we bring about such an agreement between the two parties?

[Answer] Regarding that part of the question which has to do with the civil strife which occurred in a holy place, let me say that such an act is objectionable. Islamic movements and Islamic thinkers, each in his own field, expressed disapproval of this civil strife. This action subjected pilgrims' lives to danger in one of Islam's holiest spots. A repeat of this action is something that everyone must work to avoid. We have always, of course, supported the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's security agencies. We want them to be capable of nipping such civil strife in the bud, and we want them to prevent its recurrence by all means. The Arab and Islamic nation must assist in controlling this matter so that nothing like that would ever happen again. For the Islamic world this was a major disaster. I remember the comment the Israeli minister of religion made on the incident when he said that it proved that Israel was the only country whose people enjoyed the freedom of worship. This, as you know, of course, is a major lie. There is no freedom in Israel, but there is a false and shiny appearance. However, this civil strife gave the Zionist enemy something he could use to promote his own cause and falsify facts. This is an open-and-shut case, and we must do everything we can to prevent its recurrence.

I believe this is a lesson that Iran has understood. Iran realizes that such an action cost it much of its reputation in the Islamic world. It created many enemies for Iran and denied the country any measure of sympathy from Muslims who care about the inviolability of the pilgrimage and keeping politics out of Islam's two most sacred sites. As I said before, the dangers which are looming in the region require Iran to realize that muddying the waters in the neighboring area will not be an easy task. The sooner an understanding is reached on the formulas and kinds of dealings that can be made between regimes in the Arab region and Islamic movements, the greater the barrier such an understanding will present to all challenges in the region, especially Iranian challenges.

Role of Political Organization Under Islamic Rule Discussed

44040177 Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
29 Mar 88 pp 26-29

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi]

[Text] There are three matters which impel us to set forth in this column issues concerning Muslims and the Islamic Movement:

1. We receive a large volume of mail from readers asking for more such fruitful discussions with leaders, thinkers, and major proponents of the Universal Islamic Movement on the Arab and Islamic scene.

2. Islamic thinkers and proponents are participating in this dialogue on Islamic issues and issues pertaining to propounding the faith; they are enriching that dialogue.

3. AL-MUJTAMA' Magazine believes that using the format of a dialogue between experts and specialists to set forth the needs of a proponent of Islam has to be a basic step in the process of shoring up activities that have to do with promoting the faith.

Although questions about understanding the process of promoting the faith abound, we will try, God willing, to set forth those questions which are on a list of priorities. We hope that Islamic thinkers and leaders of this awakening will continue their participation in this dialogue.

At this week's forum AL-MUJTAMA' met with the following persons:

1. Mr Kamil al-Sharif, former minister of religious trusts in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

2. Dr Mani' Hamad al-Jihni, secretary general of the International Forum for Young Muslims in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

3. Mr Yusuf al-'Azm, a member of parliament in Jordan.

The issues discussed in this installment of the forum were raised in accordance with the following questions:

[Question] Proponents of religion have different attitudes toward political party organizations on the Islamic scene. What do you think is Islam's attitude toward political party organizations?

Kamil al-Sharif

Mr Kamil al-Sharif answered that question by saying, "Personally, I am in favor of freedom for political parties. I believe that Muslims are the first people to suffer when political parties are suspended in a country, and they are the first to benefit when people can enjoy complete freedom of action. One should never have fears about Islam in a climate of freedom because it is the

religion of the majority. Islam is the religion of truth and action. It is also the religion that has to win others over, not the opposite. I believe that those few Muslims who advocate repressing political parties under the pretext that Islam is one party and that it does not recognize political parties are extremely short-sighted. Islam supports dialogue, and numerous verses can be found in the Holy Koran which talk about discussions even with idolators and believers of other religions. Let me say here that Islam is like a fully grown tree which does not keep out sunlight and air. That is why I am in favor of political parties whose activities are carried out in the context of a positive political life. I believe that such a situation is beneficial and not at all harmful to Islam."

The Pluralism of Islamic Action

[Question] Do you think pluralism in contemporary Islamic action is a healthy or an unhealthy phenomenon?

Dr Mani' al-Jihni

Dr Mani' al-Jihni responded to that question by saying, "Unity has always been the foundation of Islamic action. Islam is always instructing Muslims to unite, to work together and to speak with one voice. It warns Muslims against the disunity and conflict which are incompatible with its instructions.

"Therefore, as many intellectual and organizational efforts as possible must be devoted to the achievement of unity so that the notion of preferring unity and hating disunity would become self-evident to anyone who is interested in Islamic action.

"If unity cannot be achieved for one reason or another, then people should cooperate with each other. If they cannot do that, they should coexist. Destruction would be the outcome of anything else.

"And yet, unity does not necessarily mean that all activities should conform to similar patterns. Nor should all societies have the same program or even the same particulars and choices. What is important is that priorities and fundamental rules be the same. Pluralism which takes that into consideration would not be objectionable. Some people like to say that such a situation constitutes 'Diversity in a framework of unity'."

[Question] Does this mean that multiple political parties would be permitted in an Islamic state?

Yusuf al-'Azm

Mr Yusuf al-'Azm took up the answer to this question. He said, "We must first define the concept of a political party. Does it mean a group of people who are organized into one association whose objective is to attain power regardless of the means and methods used and taken to achieve that objective?

"Does it mean an organization whose mission is to change the system of government, remove an Islamic government, and replace it with one which would govern by relying on misguided ideas, spurious opinions derived from misconstrued religions, secular principles, existentialism, materialism and other non-religious isms?"

"Or does the term, political party, in that question mean a group of people who have programs and objectives they strive to accomplish in accordance with the assumptions of Islamic thought and doctrine?"

"In an Islamic society the first two definitions would be unacceptable because they are incompatible with Islamic doctrine and the spirit of objective, purposeful dialogue. Even today we can still see that so-called democratic countries refuse to establish in their countries political parties which adopt opinions other than those of the ruling political establishment. Give me the name of a political party in Russia whose opinion differs from that of the Communist Party, or show me a communist party in the United States that is freely exercising its activities. Why then are 'clients' of the East and West demanding that an Islamic state have godless, secular parties whose opinions and ideas are at odds with monotheism, the primary principle upon which an Islamic state is founded?"

"The third definition then is the one that is acceptable. One or more groups who subscribe to removing deficiencies, bringing people closer together, and guiding and advising people can be established. This can be done provided those who have different opinions do not resort to using force and do not stir up civil strife which would fragment the nation and cause it to lose its way. That would eventually lead to division, weakness and loss. In accordance with the third definition, those who disagree with the ruler's opinions should not press people to unite and come together to create chaos and stir up disturbances unless the ruler is engaged in practices which violate the Koran and the prophet's tradition. Only sincere and active scholars who can exercise independent judgment can make such a determination.

"It is evident from what I said that Islam does not prohibit the establishment of an association of people who adopt ideas and examine opinions that could be useful to the nation and helpful in developing and improving the state. But such a bloc or organization must be founded on the principles of Islamic doctrine even though the methods of its key figures may differ with those of the ruler and even though they may adopt legitimate means other than those which are being utilized by those in power."

[Question] What are the factors involved in forming public opinion in Islam?

Kamil al-Sharif

An answer to that question came from Mr Kamil al-Sharif. "Public opinion in Islam must be formed in accordance with the prophet's Islamic standards, with ideal standards for promoting the faith, with setting a good example, and with promoting good role models. People who are responsible for forming public opinion must not get tired of doing any of that. We must not expect a miracle; nor should we expect a hero to come out of nowhere and restore this nation's prestige and status. Heroes are created by a climate of work, and the general climate can only be changed by agents of change, no matter how slow they are. As we said, these agents of change are the young, who are to be educated; women; and the home. Of course to effect change many instruments, such as mosques, debates, clubs, meetings, youth camps, and others are used. All these instruments are founded on the basis of forming public opinion which is sensitive, opposed to evil, intent on virtue, and willing to cooperate with others to establish an Islamic government on the land. I believe that in that respect Islamic movements are off to a good start. But they have to continue moving in that direction because that effort which seems simple is the most serious effort."

4. The Different Opinion

[Question] What will become of freedom of opinion in an Islamic state? Can an individual or a group express a different opinion in an Islamic state?

Mr Yusuf al-'Azm

Mr Yusuf al-'Azm spoke in detail about that question and said, "An individual or a group in an Islamic state can express an opinion that differs from that of a Muslim ruler provided that opinion is not incompatible with the nation's faith which is based on monotheism. That individual or group should say nothing which contradicts what the Koran or the tradition of the prophet firmly ordered or forbade. Nor should either advocate with blind determination and deaf obstinacy anything that is incompatible with anything about which the nation's scholars, theologians, and opinion leaders have reached unanimous agreement. A group or an individual must not strive to promote his opinion to spread chaos and corruption. That is what spurious and corrupt opinions do; they target a nation's faith, existence and dignity.

"Our nation's history is full of those who differed with rulers and leaders and with scholars as well before they reached a consensus on many positions. The existence of multiple schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence is nothing but clear evidence that it is permissible to have differences of opinion and to adopt ideas and plans that differ from those adopted by a ruler. Anyone who has traced Islamic history is familiar with many positions in which citizens of a nation disagreed with its rulers. Those citizens discussed their opinions with their rulers until

an understanding and agreement about what was good and beneficial for the nation were reached. The more tolerant rulers are of the opinions held by those who disagree with them, the happier the nation and the more favorable examples there are of citizens sharing experiences, treating each other well, and communicating clearly with each other.

"We still read about Bilal, may God be pleased with him, who disagreed with an opinion expressed by 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him. The two men, may God be pleased with them, were seeking the interests of the Islamic nation. We still read about those who disagreed with Abu Bakr and 'Uthman, may God be pleased with them. The ruler listened to the different opinion, and no harm came to those who had expressed it. In fact, quite the opposite happened: Dhu al-Nurayn 'Uthman became the victim of the intransigence of those who had disagreed with him. 'Ali, may God be pleased with him, used to affirm that anyone who disagrees with the imam can still receive his share of funds from the state's treasury, just as other Muslims do.

"But if the term, different opinion, is used to mean introducing corrupt beliefs and destructive modes of conduct, then that is something which no sane person would accept for his country or his nation."

5. Between Authenticity and Contemporaneity

[Question] The modern Islamic movement is torn between authenticity and contemporaneity. How can the Islamic movement be both authentic and contemporaneous?

Dr Mani' al-Jihni

Dr Mani' al-Jihni graciously answered the last question in this installment. He said, "We must warn people at the outset that there is more than one serious pitfall in the terms, 'authenticity and contemporaneity.' The first impression which both terms bring to mind is that the authentic is old and the contemporary is new. Although one can accept such an impression with some caution, one must wake up to the fact that it would be a big mistake to accept decisive and definitive definitions of the two terms which rule out any other interpretation. Both terms involve good things as well as bad things. That is why in accepting what we accept and rejecting what we reject, we must be guided by truth, rather than authenticity or contemporaneity.

"After this word of caution, let us go back to the required integration between authenticity and contemporaneity in the Islamic Movement.

"In Islamic action there are elements which are constant and others which are variable. It behooves us to distinguish wisely between what is constant and what is variable.

"The most important constant principles include continuing to urge people to embrace God's religion; placing emphasis on the fundamental priorities of Islamic facts and principles when taking action; adopting the ideas of Sunnis and the prophet's companions because they are the best representatives of Islam; affirming that one should be loyal to ideas and not to persons; and affirming the importance and need for collective action.

"The variable principles have to do with those means which ought to be utilized by Islamic action, such as lectures, symposia, books, work in mosques, magazines, newspapers, parliament, and other such means.

"Although constant principles are always desirable, the variable ones must always be subject to change according to need. They must never remain static because holding on to those means or principles whose inability or unsuitability to a certain situation has been proven is somewhat suicidal.

"Something which might be suitable for one time might not be suitable for another. In fact, it might be suitable in one country but not simultaneously in another. The means we use to achieve our objectives are merely tools for action and not objectives. They must never become our objective."

Dr Mani' concluded his answer by saying, "What is important is that Islamic action recognize what is constant and what is variable. It is important that Islamic action proclaim slogans which are compatible with the stage and with its own potential. It should then utilize, and continually renew and revise all the means it has at its disposal. Islamic action must borrow continuously from others' experiences, even the experiences of non-Muslims. Wisdom is a believer's only guide: once he finds wisdom, he should follow it. Of course, a person's choices are limited to those means which are virtuous and permissible. In Islamic action the means are inseparable from the ends which are being sought. An honorable end can never be achieved if dishonorable means are used to achieve it."

AL-MUJTAMA': "We thank our distinguished colleagues who joined us in answering the questions of this installment. We hope that fellow citizens who have opinions on these matters will write to us to enrich the issues of our forum. We will be waiting for your letters. May God reward you well and may His peace, His mercy and His blessings be bestowed upon you."

GLASNOST, TASS Differ on Number of Casualties

46050007d Athens AZAT OR in Armenian
8 Mar 88 p 4

[Text] Sergei Grigoryants, a representative of Soviet dissident circles and the editor of the paper, GLASNOST, disclosed in Moscow that as many as 100 people died in the clashes in Azerbaijan. TASS put the number of dead at 31.

According to latest reports, Moscow has rushed aid to the refugees from Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani authorities, acting on instructions from Moscow, have begun permitting all people wishing to leave Azerbaijan to migrate using airplanes, trains and cars.

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Poetess Kaputikyan Conveys Gorbachev's Message

46050007b Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian
29 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] According to reports from Yerevan, poetess Silva Kaputikyan appeared on Yerevan television 2 nights ago and declared officially that she and journalist Zori Balayan had a meeting with Gorbachev. Kaputikyan called on the Armenians to end their demonstrations and said that Gorbachev promised that a fair resolution will be found for the problem. Kaputikyan added that Gorbachev acknowledged that he made a mistake by attributing the demonstrations to extremist forces and that, in some sense, he told the Armenians: "You won." Gorbachev added, however, that the Armenians' peaceful but unprecedented massive demonstrations may undermine the reforms that are being put in place. Kaputikyan said that she responded that the Armenians do not intend to do that.

Meanwhile, the Azerbaijanis officially confirmed that two Azerbaijanis died during clashes. The two were called Bakhtiar Aliev, 16, and Ali Gaziev, 23. The Azerbaijani government declared that those responsible for the two deaths will be punished.

9588

Armenians Warned Against Armed Azeris

46050008 Paris GAMK in Armenian 24 Mar 88 p 1

[Editorial by "Armen": "So That Tumanian's Message Will not be Forgotten"]

[Excerpt] The atrocities committed against the Armenians in Azerbaijan are worrisome for several reasons. Considering that the campaign for the liberation of Gharabagh will probably take the form of a long-term struggle, the atrocities that have been committed may

potentially be transformed into full-scale massacres. Consequently, it is necessary to think seriously about the physical safety of the Armenians of Azerbaijan keeping in mind the role they may play in the future phases of the Armenian Cause.

What is clear is that with these atrocities the fascist Tatars of Azerbaijan want to give a different character to the Gharabagh issue and to create a political situation that is favorable to them. Today, elements in the Western alliance as well as Turkish-Tatar circles wish to portray the Gharabagh issue as a pretext for fanning Islamic fanaticism and Turkish nationalism and to use the "ethnic" clashes as evidence for that.

The important issue of the physical safety of the Armenians of Azerbaijan must not dampen our struggle, but it must not be ignored.

There are fanatic, nationalist and anti-Soviet groups in the Turkish-Tatar republics of the Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan, which are trying to exploit the "pretext" for their reactionary motives. These groups include the "Islamic Brethren," "Hojatiyeh," and the "Sufis" which are capable of putting on stage organized "hooligans" even if that is not what the Azerbaijani government wants.

What is doubly worrisome for the Armenian people is that Turks and Azeris in Azerbaijan, Nakhichevan as well as Armenia are armed not just with hunting guns but also army weapons which they often smuggle from "neighboring" Turkey.

It must not be forgotten that when demonstrations marking the 50th anniversary of the Armenian genocide were taking place in Yerevan in 1965, the news immediately reached the Azeri residents of Zankezur. The Azeris, most of whom had weapons, rose to the mountains and took up previously decided positions "to defend themselves."

Similarly, one must not forget the following:

"We have written several times that the Azeri villages of the Transcaucasus are armed. Who arms them and from where? On several occasions trucks carrying wool and meat from Turkey to Nakhichevan were discovered to be carrying armaments. One can buy any type of weapon in the markets of cities and rural centers in Azerbaijan."

Aimless and reactionary ethnic clashes must be avoided, and to that end various propaganda and corrective methods must be employed. On the other hand, we must be prepared to defend ourselves when such clashes are unavoidably imposed on us.

Providing for the self-defense and safety of the Armenians of Azerbaijan is principally the responsibility of the Armenian government, the intelligentsia and the

leadership of the Armenians of Azerbaijan and—why not—Armenian organizations [in the diaspora]. Each has its own share of responsibility in the eyes of history.

Clashes must be avoided but it is essential to be prepared to defend ourselves when necessary with Tumanian's revolutionary spirit of "eye for an eye."

That is the bloodiest of the lessons learned from the demonstrations for Gharabagh.

9588

Autonomous Status of Gharabagh Labeled 'Fictitious'

46050007a Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 18 Mar 88 p 1

[Text] Moscow—The magazine, MOSCOW NEWS, carries in its latest edition an article by Karen Khachaturian, the deputy head of the Soviet official news agency, NOVOSTI, about the status of Mountainous Gharabagh.

According to the article, the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Gharabagh is "autonomous" only in name and that it is in fact fully controlled by the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic to which it was annexed under Stalin. Thus, doctors and teachers, for example, cannot be appointed in Gharabagh without the permission of the Azerbaijani authorities.

Khachaturian expresses regret that neither the Soviet constitution nor the constitutions of the Soviet republics specify the rights of the eight autonomous regions and concludes that their autonomy is "fictitious."

Khachaturian, who personally visited the areas where the disturbances occurred, notes several examples of "violation of rights." He says that neither Armenian history nor Armenian geography are taught in Gharabagh's only institution of higher learning. He adds that the region is cut off from Armenia and that it cannot even receive Armenian-language books.

According to Khachaturian, the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU which will examine the secretariat's recommendations on the Gharabagh issue "will study means of protecting economic and cultural rights in autonomous regions against any unconstitutional moves." He states that Gharabagh is only one of sensitive issues in ethnic relations in the Soviet Union.

The Novosti official also notes the various arguments that have been presented to have Gharabagh annexed to Armenia. He states that the resolution voted by Gharabagh's assembly demanding the return of Gharabagh to Armenia "is unprecedented in the history of the Soviet nationalities."

The article notes that despite all these the Central Committee of the CPSU found that resolution as "harmful to the interests of the workers of the two republics."

9588

Turkish View of Gharabagh Incidents Outlined

46050009a Istanbul JAMANAK in Armenian
17 Mar 88 p 2

[Text] BULVAR writes in an article entitled "The Armenian is Awake While the Turk Sleeps:"

In fact, everything began after the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. Although it has not said so explicitly, the United States was determined to pull out of Europe. Leaving Europe to solve its own problems in order to teach the "conceited" Old World a lesson was part of plan that had been prepared several years before. Similarly, the Soviets were planning to institute some reforms in their own country. Some formal changes were essential before the arrival of the 21st century. "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" were in fact the result of these ideas. Gorbachev thought that the Soviets would be safer and the reforms he was planning would be easier to implement in a Europe disengaged of the United States. That way the United States would have abandoned the Soviet satellite nations. Under such circumstances, the Soviets would be able to create freer conditions in both their country and the satellite nations. The goal was the preparation of a more peaceful world in the 21st century.

But Armenian-Americans exploited the summit meeting; they won the sympathy of Raisa Gorbachev in New York and declared her a supporter of Armenians.

Meanwhile, Armenian Catholicos Vazken I took advantage of the more liberal atmosphere in the Soviet Union and visited several Western countries. On suitable occasions, he waged anti-Turkish propaganda and appealed for help for the Armenians of the world. The principal cause Vazken I preached was the things that happened to the Armenians in 1915 and the "genocide" issue.

It is because of these reasons that Turkey is forced to view the events in Gharabagh from a different perspective.

In a speech last year, Vartan Gregorian, the president of the New York Public Library, clearly outlined the main features of the Armenian long-term strategy. Let us examine that strategy in the light of the latest developments.

Secret Armenian Machinations

1. The Soviet Union has officially recognized the "genocide." Even if that is not the truth, such a claim sends a message to the U. S. authorities to the effect that "when the Soviet Union is on their side why is the United States still hesitating."

2. After World War II, the Soviet Union attempted to recover the Armenian lands using serious pressure tactics, but the "cold war" prevented it from realizing that goal.

The Armenians are not upset and angry at the Soviet Union for its failure to recover the Armenian lands because they are convinced that the Soviets had reasons not to be able to do that. They understand the Soviets' difficulties and are also grateful to them because it has allowed them to form a Soviet republic where they have the opportunity to perpetuate and to safeguard their culture.

3. The Soviet Armenian republic remains intact with all its institutions. The Soviet Armenians must not be chided because of their communist system. The Russians must not be antagonized even in the face of the Russification campaign. On the contrary, they must be shown understanding and given assistance because the Armenian spirit will withstand any foreign pressures.

4. The only way to recover the Armenian lands in Turkey is a Kurdish liberation war. The possibility of changing Turkey's borders depends on the success of the Kurdish movement.

9588

Gharabagh's CP Votes To Join ASSR, Awaits Moscow's Decision

46050009b Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian
19 Mar 88 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Anatolia Agency and other news agencies recently reported that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Gharabagh officially voted to annex the autonomous region of Gharabagh to Armenia. A prominent member of the Central Committee of the Gharabagh Communist Party phoned the French news agency office in Moscow and reported that the said decision was published in the paper SOVIETSKI KARABAKH.

The Gharabagh Communist Party's decision reiterates the call for the rectification of the historic mistake made in 1923 whereby Gharabagh was annexed to Azerbaijan.

It is noted that the Gharabagh Communist Party's decision notwithstanding, the final decision on this issue must come from Moscow.

Meanwhile, Soviet authorities cancelled at the last minute a soccer match between Moscow Spartak and Kiev Dinamo to prevent any possible disturbances. The authorities stated that the game was cancelled because of bad weather.

It is reported that the Armenian exodus from Sumgait in Azerbaijan continues. Large numbers of Armenians have been arriving in Yerevan by plane, cars and buses. Yerevan television carried film footage of the immigrants arriving in Yerevan. The Armenian authorities greet the immigrant Armenians with ceremonies.

9588

Integration of Armenia Seen as Restitution for Genocide

46050006 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 10 Mar 88 p 1

[Editorial: "Integration of Armenia is the Restitution the Perpetrator of the Genocide Must Pay"]

[Text] Bad news have been coming from Azerbaijan. It is becoming increasingly evident that there has been mass murder, rape, looting and forced deportation in Azerbaijan in reaction to the Armenian demands for the return of Gharabagh to Armenia.

Evidently, nothing has changed in the instincts of the Turkish nation. Whenever presented with the opportunity, the Turks' monstrous nature is quickly reawakened and directed against their traditional targets: defenseless women, elderly people and children.

This situation has once again exposed the Turks' political mentality which is based on racism, fanaticism, pan-Turanism and genocidal tactics.

Faced with the racist policies and genocidal instincts of the Turk, Armenians are naturally inflamed with feelings of revenge; this refreshes the historic antagonism which is rooted in the destructive raids of the Turkish hordes, the massacre and enslavement of the Armenian people, the extermination of Armenian culture, the uprooting of the Armenian people, the Armenian genocide and the seizure of the Armenian homeland.

With typical Turkish insolence, the Azerbaijani refers to Ankara as its "brother" and, just like Ankara, it dares the Armenian people with the battle cry: "Come and get it—if you can."

At a time when the special integration of Armenia and new triumphs for the Armenian nation are at issue and when the Armenian people are at a new juncture of national self-determination and progress, it is essential to remain cool-headed and far-sighted and not to fall into the trap that the Turk is setting with his peculiarly beastly cunning.

Between February 20 and 28, 1 million Armenians marched in Yerevan in an orderly and lawful manner. They demonstrated civic boldness and moderation; they expressed themselves with unequaled awareness and maturity and scored a notable victory.

They scored a victory in itself because the Armenian was able to rein his emotions and to properly modulate the march of the 1 million.

They also scored a victory in terms of ethnic rivalry within the Soviet Union. The sober Armenian nation pursued its national and territorial demands without violating Soviet laws and principles. An entire nation acted like a single soul and hand and presented to the Soviet leadership a proper protest for a just cause.

In contrast to this positive attitude of the Armenian people, the Turks of Azerbaijan resorted to their usual measures and tried to tilt the circumstances in their favor by persecuting and massacring Armenians. Their goal was to terrorize the Armenian inhabitants of Azerbaijan in order to force them to emigrate; to "validate" the contrived nation of Azerbaijan while trying to suck the Armenian nation into the quicksand of ethnic bloodshedding; to distort the legal and moral nature of the Armenian demands; to promote an atmosphere of general turbulence; and thus to push into oblivion the real issue, namely Gharabagh.

In the face of this policy based on distortion, deceit, beastly savagery and racist cunning, we refuse to change the battleground and reduce ourselves to a policy of "eye for an eye" which may be satisfying emotionally but immature politically.

Because the triumphant nations are those which know how to control their subjective world, to evaluate the objective conditions accurately and to act in a timely and proper manner.

While we remain on this high level of national and political awareness—as demonstrated by Yerevan's 1 million—we cannot, however, ignore the killing of innocent Armenians.

It is imperative to demand just restitution. The mere condemnation of the perpetrators is not enough to satisfy the Armenian nation, because what lies under the massacre of those Armenians is pan-Turanism, the Turk's racist character and its satanic dream of exterminating the entire Armenian nation.

Restitution for the blood of the innocent Armenian victims requires the implementation of justice in the political as well as the territorial sense.

An integrated Armenia which can act as a bulwark against pan-Turanism and all destructive conspiracies in the region is the answer to the perpetrators of genocide.

That is what is expected from the Soviet leadership: to be fair and objective in order to end once and for all these racist tendencies which threaten the brotherhood of nations and regional peace.

9588

Demirchian Addresses Recent Problems

*46050007c Athens AZAT OR in Armenian
9 Mar 88 p 1*

[Text] Karen Demirchian, the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, addressed the Armenian people during the weekend. He remains in office although it was reported that he was dismissed from office and replaced by Suren Harutyunian. In his address, Demirchian emphasized the need for the reinforcement of the traditional friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia. He said: "Only such a posture can serve the interests of the Soviet people."

9588

REGIONAL

Saudi Contributions To Aid Uprising Continue *Jeddah 'OKAZ in Arabic 3 Apr 88 p2*

[Text] Offices of the Popular Committees for the Aid of Palestinian mujahidin received a new installment of donations from people supporting the uprising. The installment amounted to 2,490,898 rials; as of now, the Committees have received a total of 18,547,774 rials.

These donations are a result of a campaign which was initiated by His Royal Highness Prince Salman 'Abd-al-Aziz, governor of Riyadh and chairman of the aforementioned committees. His Royal Highness' appeal is still resounding throughout official and non-official circles of society and has been met with genuine support from citizens and residents; thus a number of public and private organizations are continuing to make contributions.

Morocco Presents Guidelines for Cooperation With Egypt

*45000067 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
3 Apr 88 p 9*

[Text] Morocco's ambassador in Cairo, Muhammad al-Tazi, has presented a report to President Husni Mubarak in the name of the Moroccan government concerning bilateral cooperation. The report speaks of potential trade relations and joint cooperation. Rabat requested that Cairo announce its position clearly on the [Western] Sahara conflict, the Polisario front, and Morocco's rights on this level.

The report pointed out that, during the past 3 years, Cairo had received delegations representing the so-called "Saharan Arab Republic" in the framework of conferences convened or organized by the OAU.

In the same framework, Morocco asked Egypt for an increase in the amount of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries and discussed the establishment of a joint ministerial committee patterned after the Jordanian-Egyptian committee, especially since the trade agreement contracted with both Spain and Portugal will expire in 1995 after they join the European Common Market.

The report also proposed supporting military cooperation between the two countries in the field of manufacturing. In this regard, Morocco expressed a readiness to contribute to the capital of the Arab Organization for Industrialization and finance military production projects. Morocco also wants to obtain the equipment and spare parts that it needs, especially in light of the dangers that it faces.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Shaykh al-Sa'ih Discusses Islamic Trends in Uprising

*44040191 Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
15 Mar 88 pp 26-27*

[Interview with Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, president of the Palestine National Council by Jamal al-Rashid: "Disregarding the Strength of Islamic Movements Would Be a Big Mistake;" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Question] What do you think about the uprising and the fact that it is being protracted?

[Answer] The uprising is not the first action taken by Palestinians. I remember that we had an armaments conference in 1936. I was a judge in Nablus then, and although I was a civil servant, we attacked the British government because it was discriminating between Arabs and Jews. The Jews used to smuggle all kinds of weapons with impunity, but if the British were to find one bullet with an Arab, they would execute him or sentence him to die. The British executed many of our young people as a result of this unjust law. That is why we acted against them and held what we called an armaments conference. That conference was soon followed by the movement of Shaykh al-Qassam which confronted the British force directly.

In 1936 we organized a strike which lasted for 6 months. When we went on strike, we had not decided that we would continue to strike for 6 months. We went on strike to express our displeasure with British policy and British partiality for the Jews. But the people were aware, and they understood that the British attack which supported Zionist arrogance provided the biggest support for the Jews. What the British did then is exactly what America is doing now. That is why the strike lasted for 6 months. We never thought it would last for 2 or 3 months. In fact, before the strike judges and civil servants of different kinds, ranks and positions wrote memoranda to the British High Commissioner to protest and denounce the British government's position. I was a judge, and judges did not accept any court actions or settle any problems. The strike was a general and sweeping strike that lasted 6 months. The British government then resorted to its twisted ways and used its weak-willed agents. I hope we will not be hurt by the protraction of this uprising because this uprising, whose weapons are stones, has had more of an effect worldwide than any freedom-fighting action taken by the Palestinian people.

In 1937 there was a lot of anger, and the situation was boiling. Andrews was the governor of Hebron District in al-Nasirah. Of all British governors he was the one who hated Arabs the most, and he was the most partial to the Jews. Two freedom fighters killed him and his secretary in the middle of the street. I was a judge in Nablus then. The British arrested a large number of Palestinians of all

kinds, and I was one of those arrested. They arrested no less than 2,000 persons, and they took them to Acre Farm where they set up camps for them and treated them in a manner which showed how much the British hated the Palestinian people.

This is the point I want to make: Did such mistreatment have an effect on the Palestinian people in all periods, during the days of the armaments conference, the partition, the strikes, or afterwards? Not at all. When we were under arrest in 1937, our children and our friends used to come to see us with smiles on their faces and joy in their hearts, and we used to greet them from behind the barbed wire.

The Muslim people of Palestine are a great people, not because we are Palestinians, but because we will not be brought to our knees. We will neither surrender nor give up our sacred country which was molded by the blood of the prophet's companions and by the blood of martyrs, innocent people and scholars. Our country is a country declared by God to be sacred and associated with the faith of Muslims and their Koran. Can Muslims give up such a country simply because of something that Peres, Shamir, or Reagan say? That is nonsense. Nothing that is being said deserves any serious consideration. This is because we are bound by our faith, our charter, and our principles. We have national council resolutions and central council resolutions, and we can't violate any of them. And there are enduring rights which no one can give up.

We are telling them, "At least the Fez Conference that all Arabs agreed to was realized." We told them quite frankly, "Don't ask the Arabs to make concessions." After the Jews took all of Palestine, Britain's minister of foreign affairs came along and said, "Unless both parties make concessions, there would be no solution." Does this mean giving up Palestine? Does it mean making more and more concessions? We shouldn't even be thinking about such things.

Ever since 1936 when the strike broke out, rumors would be spread after every month the strike continued. We were asked, "Where did you go? Where did the money come from? Where did you get it from? Who gave it to you?" I myself used to collect the contributions. We had a committee, and we used to distribute the money. We used to go to homes and give people the money. We should not repeat what happened. The Palestine cause has gone through successive stages which are based on arousing suspicions. That is what the Israelis and the United States want. They want our leaders to forsake us. They would then say, "There are no Palestinians, and there are no Palestinian people." Others would then undertake to find a solution to this question, and that would be the end of that.

That is why I say quite sincerely that we should neither listen nor hear any of the things that are being said in this regard. We have to utilize institutions to correct any

statement that we can confirm was in fact made by somebody. That is how we can make matters right. But repeating rumors and charges is what the Israelis want. They want us to lose our leaders and to forfeit the uprising which we must support.

[Question] And what about the ship that was bound to carry Palestinians back to their homeland?

[Answer] The idea of that ship supported the uprising and did not oppose it. In the statement we issued, we quoted what God Almighty said: "He who has committed the Koran to your keeping will surely bring you home again" [al-Qassas: 75]. That is how we began our statement. God Almighty promised His prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, that He would return him to Mecca on a certain date after he had been unjustly and aggressively thrown out of that city.

That is why our faith impels us to believe that our return as a result of our uprising and our continued struggle for freedom is inevitable. It is also our right as people who were sent out of their homeland—and I was one of the first to be sent out of Palestine. We have the right to go back to our homes and our families. Security Council Resolution 607 stated that the occupied land was occupied area. This means that the provisions of Article Four of the 1949 Geneva Convention apply here. Occupation forces may not drive any civilian out of his country. When we decided to return, we took no weapons with us, not even stones. We took nothing but our faith and our conviction that we have a right to go back. If the idea had been put into action, and if the ship had sailed a few miles at sea, the Israeli entity would have been shaken. But the Israelis were shaken, and differences were created in their midst even though the ship did not sail. One thousand Zionists, including 99 senior officers, are telling Zionist authorities, "Enough. You have ignored facts long enough. You must recognize the PLO, and you must forget about the idea of a Greater Israel."

[Question] Why shouldn't Muslims visit al-Aqsa Mosque once a year at the invitation of Islamic and popular organizations?

[Answer] That is a wonderful suggestion. Let me remind you, however, that when Hasan al-Tuhami was secretary general of the Islamic Conference, he came to Amman and told me that he wanted to make a suggestion to countries of the Islamic Conference Organization. He wanted to suggest that 50,000 Muslims visit al-Aqsa Mosque. I asked him, "Do you want permission from the Jews?" He replied, "No." I said, "Then you can add my name to yours when you make that proposal." He presented the matter to Islamic governments, and they turned it down because it could lead to clashes with the Jews. I hope that circumstances will permit Muslims to go to al-Aqsa Mosque. Lutfi al-Khuli suggested that one million persons travel from Arab and Islamic countries to Palestine to show support for the Palestinian people. We approve of that. What is important, however, is to

find that number of people who are citizens of Arab or Islamic countries and who would be willing to participate in such a demonstration.

[Question] You were a contemporary of al-Shaykh al-Qassam. Today, you are the president of the Palestine National Council, which is the largest Palestinian popular institution. You are a Muslim scholar. Why don't you call for a war to liberate Palestine? You would thus be ending your career with a good deed, and God would give you credit for it.

[Answer] We did call for war, and we said several times in writing that it was necessary. We said that it was the duty of every Muslim to fight for our country's liberation. We said that anyone who can do any kind of fighting should not refrain from doing his duty. But who was listening? Show me one state that opened its borders to those freedom fighters.

[Question] But a freedom fighter does not wait for permission to go to Palestine to fight against the occupiers, does he?

[Answer] We tried; we took action; and we got resolutions out of the Academy of Islamic Research, which includes scholars from 40 to 50 Islamic countries. It is the duty of every Muslim man and woman to fight to champion the cause of Palestinians. Anyone who fails to carry out that duty is committing a sin. Furthermore, I said a few days ago that until leaders clear their conscience, they have to support the uprising in a manner that would provide it with all its needs. Talking is one thing, and taking action is another. This is something that is out of our hands. What would we do if you and I were to resolve to go and fight only to be told that we should turn around and go back? Do we engage them in a fight?

[Question] In the context of the blessed uprising, what is the relationship between Muslims and other national groups inside the occupied land?

[Answer] We suffered whenever we saw disputes in the occupied land between the Islamic tendency and the national tendency. Let me tell you that we tried very hard to persuade both sides that such disputes did not serve the interests of the Palestinian cause. The interests of the cause would be served, we said, if you work together as one and if you agree to put an end to the occupation. After you do that, we can then agree on a solution. But before the occupation is brought to an end no group should tell the other, "Our group is the only one to take action." Muslim Brothers, libertarians, and national movements are not to do that. And national movements are misunderstood. Who said they are anti-Islamic? National movements are an integral part of Islam. God Almighty said, "Muster against them all the men and cavalry at your disposal" [al-Anfal: 60]. "Whether unarmed or well-equipped, march on and fight for the cause of Allah" [al-Tawbah: 41]. "Those that

have ... fought for the cause of Allah with their wealth and their persons ..." [al-Tawbah: 20]. "And how should you not fight for the cause of Allah, and for the helpless old men, women and children..." [al-Nisa': 75]. Isn't this fighting for freedom? Aren't spoken words part of the fight for freedom? The Holy Koran is full of holy verses which urge people to fight. No one should take those verses and keep them to himself. They belong to every Arab and every Muslim.

That is why we must not become preoccupied with disputes because that is what the Jews and Americans want. That is why I used to say in the Executive Committee, "It would be a big mistake to overlook the power of Islamic movements and to have any conflict or contradiction occur between Islamic and national movements." Our fellow Palestinians inside the country are now in agreement, and we no longer hear any of them saying, "Only me and no one else." Everyone in the occupied land should join forces with everybody else against the Zionist enemy. After we are done with that enemy, then we can assume another position.

There are Muslim Brothers inside the country, and we respect them. And there are other Islamic movements which we respect also. I personally am critical of the fact that we have too many Islamic movements. It is my opinion that Islamic movements should unite. Although it is permissible to have multiple political parties, Islam is one religion. The Koran is one book. There is only one prophet, and there is only one direction we face when we pray.

08592

Al-Aqsa Preacher Views Islam Among Palestinians

44040170 Kuwait *AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic*
8 Mar 88 pp 22-25

[Interview with al-Shaykh al-Baytawi, Preacher of al-Aqsa Mosque; date and place of interview not specified]

[Question] What is the purpose of your visit to Kuwait?

[Answer] We are a delegation that came to Kuwait primarily to collect alms and charitable contributions. We collect these contributions from residents who lived in the town, villages and camps of Nablus, from residents who lived on the West Bank, and from charitable residents of Kuwait. The delegation will then contact financial and official institutions, such as Bayt al-Zakah [the Foundation of Charity] and the Ministry of Religious Trusts and Islamic Affairs. This is not the first time for the Nablus Committee for Charitable Contributions to visit Kuwait. Although I personally have not visited Kuwait for 10 years, our colleagues on the committee come to Kuwait every year. There is a committee of Nablus residents who live now in Kuwait, and that

committee is authorized to facilitate the collection of charitable contributions and to deliver those contributions to the committee in Nablus.

[Question] The Prince of Kuwait made a few positive statements in which he praised the Palestinian people and their blessed revolution in the occupied territory. What do you think about the prince's statements in this regard? Do the remaining Arab and Muslim rulers have similar positions?

[Answer] The prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said, "He who does not thank people does not thank God." We thank His Highness the Prince of Kuwait, may God protect him, and we also thank any person, organization, and ruler who offered any financial or moral assistance to our Palestinian Muslim people in Palestine. We thank them all, but we also hope that all rulers and peoples of the Islamic world will unite and liberate the holy land. From them we accept nothing less than the dignity of unwavering supporters.

[Question] Do the charitable contributions which are sent to Palestine go to those who are really deserving?

[Answer] Our committee was established 10 years ago. Actually, it receives charitable contributions from residents of Nablus who reside in Kuwait and in other countries abroad, may God bless them. The committee also receives funds from that committee which exists in Kuwait and which is authorized to act on our behalf. The committee also receives voluntary and charitable contributions from some charitable persons and Islamic organizations in Kuwait, may God protect it.

[Question] Is this committee for Nablus only?

[Answer] Yes, it is, but its services go beyond Nablus. Any Palestinian who is poor and sick may receive treatment free of charge in an Islamic hospital which is affiliated with the committee, and no questions are asked about that person's district. The committee also helps poor students everywhere in Palestine, even in the Gaza Strip.

[Question] Are the committee's services restricted to hospital services and financial aid?

[Answer] The Committee for Charitable Contributions is active in numerous areas. It pays approximately 1,200 families a regular monthly allowance of between 5 and 40 dinars, depending upon the size of the family. First of all, it is committed to helping that number of people under normal conditions. But that number doubles on feasts and in emergency situations. For example, we pay these poor families 15,000 Jordanian dinars a month. But under the current abnormal conditions which Palestine has been experiencing, with small craftsmen being on strike, the committee has had to double its contributions to the poor. First, the committee helps poor families, and, second, it offers assistance in the area of

education by paying students' tuition in preparatory or secondary schools or in the university. We make no distinction between students in the Gaza Strip, in Hebron, Janin or elsewhere. We have lists of the number of poor families; these lists are compiled after a social study is conducted.

We also have a health clinic where approximately 15 physicians and nurses are employed. Construction of that clinic was funded by our fellow countrymen in Kuwait, with the assistance of the Ministry of Religious Trusts and Kuwait's Foundation for Charitable Contributions. Kuwait's Ministry of Health pays the salary of one physician who is employed at the clinic, and the Kuwaiti Fund for Patients' Assistance pays the salary of two physicians. We also have a committee that instructs others about committing the Holy Koran to memory. That committee started its work by committing to memory three sections of the Koran.

[Question] What do you think about the uprising which is taking place in Palestine these days?

[Answer] The uprising is actually a cause that belongs to all Muslims. It is the duty of all Muslims to stand alongside their fellow Muslims in Palestine. The least Muslims can do is to support those whose poverty has brought them to the brink of starvation. We are proud of this uprising, and we want to see it continue and grow until the occupiers are defeated. The Palestinian people have the resolve and the determination to do that.

[Question] What are the reasons for this uprising which has become prevalent in occupied Palestine?

[Answer] The occupation and its unjust practices make up the first and foremost reasons for the uprising. People are oppressed and terrorized by it. The army takes people by surprise and raids their homes late at night simply to terrify them. The occupation is trying to starve people. Only very few positions are now available, and a civil servant is now appointed to a job at which he earns one third the usual salary. The occupation is also pursuing a policy of denying young Palestinians an education by closing schools and universities. It is also pursuing a home destruction policy. Jews have destroyed thousands of homes, especially in villages. Rural residents are not allowed to build homes without permits, and Israeli authorities rarely give such permits. When they do, permits are issued only after large fees are paid and enormous difficulties are overcome. When a rural resident with 10 children has only 1 room for himself and his children, he has to build a home without a permit. But then Israeli authorities tear down the home which the man had saved several years to build. Injustice in Israel is such that now the authorities ask the owner of a house which has been demolished to pay the demolition cost of his house, which is 400 dinars.

Israeli authorities tore down homes, scared people, and closed universities; and they imposed taxes on merchants that were sometimes as high as 20,000 or 35,000 dinars. It is Israel's unjust policy that gave rise to this popular uprising. Israelis are pursuing an extortion policy. If a person wanted to obtain a visitor's card for one of his relatives living abroad, he would not be able to obtain that card until he applies for it several times. The only reason for that is to take away people's money. How much money is paid to the occupation's treasury when thousands apply for these permits? If a Palestinian were to travel to Jordan and then return the following day with a suit different from the one he wore when he went to Jordan, he would have to pay customs taxes on that suit. This then is the injustice that befell all the Palestinian people. In addition, the Palestinian people have given up on most of the Arab regimes on the scene. Many meetings have been held and many visits have been made, but the outcome for the Palestinian people has always been nothing. That is why the Palestinian people concluded that they had to defend themselves. They started with this very simple gesture: the revolution of stones.

Actually, it was al-Aqsa Mosque that played a major part in bringing the situation to a head. Jews had tried more than once to break into the mosque to pray. Then they tried to tear it down and to build a synagogue for themselves in its place. We, the religious judges, together with the Ministry of Religious Trusts and all groups of Muslim Palestinians were the ones who stood up to the Israeli army. We were the ones who were wounded, beaten and arrested. Then the uprising broke out in Gaza, and the rest of the occupied territory responded. Eventually, all cities, villages and camps were involved in the uprising. News of the uprising appearing in the Arab and Islamic media makes up only one percent of all the events which occur inside occupied Palestine. And now Israelis are using the latest methods of torture: they take young people on board an airplane and then drop them to earth. A few days ago they used bulldozers to bury young men alive. Too much pressure, therefore, will inevitably lead to an explosion. Today, the Palestinian people are determined to continue this uprising no matter the cost.

[Question] Today, Muslims' sympathies lie with the people of Palestine. To what extent have Muslims been able to act on their feelings?

[Answer] It is our feeling that Muslims in general have been extraordinarily derelict in their duty toward fellow Muslims in Palestine. It is unfortunate that people outside Palestine—even those who are Palestinians—are in an altogether different world. If Muslims continue to have such a negative attitude toward the question of Palestine, a setback might ensue. If our fellow Muslims do not support their Palestinian brothers, matters will get worse. Palestinian workers have been on strike for 3 months; the economic situation is completely paralyzed; Israelis have suffered economic losses; and the Israelis'

plants are idle because of the uprising. Besides, Muslims' interests and their trade have also been brought to a standstill. However, "If you have suffered, they too have suffered: but you at least hope to receive from Allah what they cannot hope for" [al-Nisa': 104]. Despite all the hardships and difficulties from which the Palestinian people have been suffering, all the old and young, and all the men and women are taking part in this uprising which no one alone can claim to be leading. All the Palestinian people have taken to the streets to continue the uprising. Evidence for that lies in the fact that when soldiers raid a home, the old and the young as well as men and women in the area resist them. That is why we hope that some people will not try to upstage the uprising.

[Question] Your Eminence, don't you think that the uprising has brought many Palestinians to Islam? Don't you think that many Palestinians are adhering to Islamic instructions and to Islamic conduct? Don't you think that the Islamic awakening in the occupied land has involved all the people of Palestine?

[Answer] I go to Jerusalem as a member of that city's Islamic Organization, and I pray at al-Aqsa Mosque at different times. Let me now tell you that before the uprising the number of worshipers at al-Aqsa Mosque for the early morning service was approximately 50, but after the uprising the number of worshipers at the early morning service approaches 300. The same is true of the remaining mosques. All the mosques are now full because of the uprising. And the statement about religion being the opiate of the people has been proven to be a lie.

[Question] If a return to strict observance of Islamic rites of worship is one of the manifestations of the Islamic awakening in Palestine, are there other aspects of that awakening?

[Answer] Actually, I've stayed close to the Palestinian scene ever since graduating from college in 1968. Let me give you examples of this Islamic awakening which Palestine has been experiencing. In 1970, for example, I visited al-Nasirah and Acre, and I participated twice in the Friday noon prayer in those two cities: once in al-Jazar Mosque and another time in al-Salam Mosque. At that time there were no more than 30 worshipers in the mosque—old men and children—and there was only one mosque in each city. But now almost five mosques have been built in each city, and these mosques are now crowded with worshipers. I was invited once to lecture in al-Salam Mosque in al-Nasirah, and although the mosque is huge, there wasn't enough room for everybody. This year I attended the Islamic Arts Festival in Kafr Qasim, which lasted for about 1 week. I don't think there is anything like that festival anywhere in the Islamic world. Approximately 10,000 Muslims used to attend the festival every day. People would walk out of the mosque into a large square to sing and perform Islamic plays on the Islamic heritage.

On the other hand, I remember that when I wanted to marry a veiled woman in 1970, none was to be found in all of Nablus. Now, however, there are thousands of unmarried women in Palestine who wear the veil: they are in the Islamic University in Gaza and in Bir Zeit University. That institution was founded as a missionary institution. Then communists brought their meaningless statements to it and, in spite of that, this university has more than 400 veiled female students out of a total of almost 3,000 male and female students. At al-Najah University more than half the female students have taken the veil. The same is true of al-Da'wah College. The military government in the occupied land finds this situation rather curious, and this shows that the authorities are annoyed by this phenomenon. Let me say that when we pray in al-Aqsa Mosque on Fridays, especially during the month of Ramadan, the scene there is not much different from that which one would see during the pilgrimage season in Mecca or Medina.

[Question] We heard about Islamic wedding celebrations in some cities in occupied Palestine. What is the nature of these wedding celebrations?

[Answer] Islamic wedding celebrations are one of the major means by which thousands of young men are drawn to Islam. I personally attended scores of Islamic wedding celebrations in a town like al-Nasirah, Shafa 'Amru, Umm al-Fahm (Umm al-Nur), and Nablus. Approximately 5,000 persons attend such a wedding celebration, and sometimes two or three couples are married at the same time. The program for an Islamic wedding is as follows: The ceremony begins with a reading from the Koran. Then all those at the wedding join together in giving the bridegroom their traditional blessing. They say, "God bless you and congratulations; may God unite you and your spouse in good things." Then they sing beautiful Islamic songs that are suitable to the idea of marriage and to promoting it. Then a group of preachers start giving religious lessons which are suitable to the general atmosphere. Each one of them would talk about a certain aspect. Some would talk about marriage, and others would talk about alcohol and drugs if the celebration were being held in an area where alcohol and drugs were widespread, for example. At some wedding celebrations, for example, a play on the Israeli occupation was presented. It focused on methods used by the Jews to corrupt young people with hashish and opium.

[Question] Do you believe that the mosque in Palestine has accomplished its mission despite all the methods of social and ideological destruction which were used by the occupation on Palestinians and promoted in their midst by atheists?

[Answer] These days mosques in occupied Palestine have more people than they did a few years ago. There are more people now than there were even in the occupied land before 1948, in Kafr Qasim and in Umm al-Fahm, which became Umm al-Nur. Let's give you an

example from Nablus where I live. There were 15 mosques in Nablus before 1967. Now, 20 years later, there are 45. What does this indicate? The same is true in all cities and villages.

Despite all the wicked methods used by the occupiers to turn people away from Islam, the Palestinian people are Muslim. God Almighty said, "The unbelievers expend their riches in debarring others from the path of Allah. Thus they dissipate their wealth: but they shall rue it, and in the end be overthrown" [al-Anfal: 36]. Jews have been using alcohol and hashish, and they have been spreading their use among Palestinians. They have been using prostitution (adultery) as a weapon, and all prostitutes have ties with intelligence. Jews have been spreading communist ideas, and they made an unambiguous announcement stating that it was Rakah, the Israeli Communist Party, that organized the Palestinian Communist Party and made plans for it. But people are flocking to Islam despite these vile methods, and the most prominent manifestations of that are the large number of mosques being built, the large number of young women who have taken the veil, and the spread of a very strong Islamic tendency in universities.

[Question] In recent years revolutionary slogans, such as socialism, were proclaimed on the Palestinian scene. These are slogans that have nothing to do with Islam. What has become of them?

[Answer] Some slogans have been weakened considerably. For example, in 1948 the Communist Party carried weight in the occupied land, especially in Umm al-Fahm, which is now Umm al-Nur. But people there turned away from Marxist ideas to Islam. On that occasion the Communist Party issued a statement entitled, "Our Losses," in which it announced that the party had lost approximately 90 persons in 1 day. We had an Islamic wedding celebration which was attended by His Eminence al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Hajj 'Ali, al-Shaykh Ahmad Abu Fu'ad, Abu Zayd, al-Faqir Lillah Ta'ala, al-Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr, and by many young Muslims. The celebration was held in a public square, and loudspeakers were used so the whole town could hear what was going on from sunset till midnight. The celebration took place right next to the Communist Party's office in Umm al-Fahm. When the communists heard what was said at this huge celebration, it was God's will that their hearts be opened, and scores of them embraced Islam.

I know someone in al-Nasirah who has been a member of the Communist Party for 20 years. It was God's will that we made this person's acquaintance at an Islamic wedding celebration that was held in that town. We asked him, "What made you return to Islam after 20 years in the Communist Party?" He said, "I attended more than one Islamic celebration, but I never knew that Islam had an economic system. I never knew Islam had a system of justice and a moral code. God wanted me to see the light, and now I wage war against the communists."

Communists, like Jews, use sex first to organize young people. The man who founded communism was a Jew. Communists use sex to attract young people in their adolescence in the name of progress and peace against imperialism, etc. At first, however, they get young men hooked on sex and girls, and they corrupt them morally. Then they corrupt them ideologically.

That is why non-Islamic currents fade like fashion which, according to sociology, is something ephemeral. Non-Islamic ideas are ephemeral, and people have to go back to Islam which is authentic and real. The Palestinian people are Muslim, and if they deviate from Islam at a certain stage as a result of domestic and universal conditions, their return to it will be powerful. No power on earth will be able to stop the Palestinians' return to Islam, especially the return of Palestinians inside Palestine, because Islam is God's religion.

[Question] If the superpowers were to agree on a solution to the Palestinian question which does not satisfy the Palestinian people's aspirations, how do you expect the people of Palestine to consider such a solution?

[Answer] As Muslims, we are saying that all of Palestine, from the sea to the river, is Islamic territory. Not one inch of this territory is to be given away. If at the present time the Palestinian people or the Islamic nation fails to liberate Palestine and restore it to Islam, God Almighty will cause our descendants to liberate it from its enemies, the Zionists. God will do this just as He caused Muslims to liberate Palestine from Christians in Saladin's days and just as He caused the Mamelukes to liberate it from the Tatars. Muslims were more divided then than they are now, but when the Christians came, God Almighty caused the Muslims to unite. The Christians were much stronger than the Jews. This is the Islamic position: Not one inch of Palestine will be negotiated away. As a Muslim and a Palestinian, Jericho, Java, and Haifa are all the same to me. We are saying they must abide by the principles they started out with in 1965: liberating all of Palestinian soil.

[Question] What are you asking of the Palestinian people living abroad?

[Answer] We are asking them first of all to return to Islam in a forceful way. God Almighty said, "Is it not time for true believers to submit to Allah's warnings..." [al-Hadid: 16]. The Islamic nation has been smitten with this disaster because it disobeyed God. God Almighty is not unjust to people. When we turned away from Islam half a century or more ago, this tragedy befell us. Our land was occupied, and our people became homeless. God's messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation, warned us when he said, "Whenever they would renege on their promise to God and His messenger, God would send against them their enemy who would take away some of their possessions."

We also advise the Palestinian people not to be deceived by any proposal, any idea, any party, or any tendency other than the Islamic tendency. Otherwise, their predicament will be prolonged, and Palestine, God forbid, may be lost. The more closely we apply ourselves to Islam, the closer we will get to liberating Palestine.

We are applying ourselves to Islam. There is a strong shift toward Islam in Palestine, and our hope is great that the country and believers will soon be rid of the occupation. We are advising our people to observe piety and to stay away from all manifestations of luxury—that epidemic which has spread in many Arab countries and has also afflicted our Palestinian people. Our fellow Arabs in Amman are living an extraordinary life of luxury while their people live a life of hardship. We are asking the Palestinian people to pay attention to their cause and abandon indifference. We are advising the people of every country to send money to their poor relatives in the occupied land. For example, there are 500 Palestinian heads of families in Kuwait. If these Palestinian families were to cooperate, they would be able to make a contribution that would relieve the suffering of poor people in Palestine. I am certain that thousands of Palestinian families in Palestine eat no meat for 1 month or more. They may have no more than one chicken which cost one or half a dinar. The messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said, "Believers should be as friendly, merciful, and as sympathetic to each other as the parts of one body are to each other. When one part is not well, all other parts join forces, becoming feverish and insomniac, to help that part get well."

We are advising Muslims not to indulge in luxury. We are advising them to stay away from forbidden activities because we have paid the price for disobedience. The nation was afflicted with these disasters in 1948 and 1967 because it turned away from God. God Almighty says, "...but he that gives no heed to My warning shall live in woe..." [Taha: 124].

[Question] What are you asking Palestinian organizations outside the occupied land to do?

[Answer] Although they cannot do what we are asking them to do, we are asking them to renounce non-Islamic ideologies. Every nation that wants to liberate its country must adopt the religion of its people. The Algerian Revolution was born in the name of Islam, and Algeria was liberated from France. The Vietnamese Revolution adopted the religion of the people, which is Marxism, and the Vietnamese people defeated the Americans. I find it very strange that the Zionist entity is founded on an ideological, religious foundation. One finds that the Israeli army has Arab Jews, Russian Jews, and European Jews. Jews gave their nation a religious name, Israel, and they called their parliament a Knesset, a word derived from the word for synagogue. They require the head of their state to have memorized the Torah and to know what it contains. Educational syllabi in the Israeli state

require 12 hours of religion a week. Thus, these people are fighting us on a religious basis, and we must fight them with the Islamic religion. We must adopt no other religion. We are a Muslim people who need the Islamic faith.

[Question] What are you asking the governments of the Islamic world to do for you?

[Answer] God will hold them accountable for this responsibility. This is what we say to them, and we hope they will hear it. The Palestinian question is an Islamic question. It is the duty of all Muslims, the people and their leaders, to do everything they can to save Palestine.

[Question] May God reward you well, Your Eminence. We ask God Almighty to grant our brothers victory over their enemies. We ask that He support them with everything they need to realize the victory that is being sought. We pray God that we meet the next time in al-Aqsa Mosque, and that is not too much to ask of God. May God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you.

08592

EGYPT

Public Opinion Polled on 'Egypt's Revolution' Trial

45040093 London *AL-DUSTUR* in Arabic
21 Mar 88 p 24

[Article by Tal'at Isma'il: "The Average Egyptian and Egypt's Revolution: 'The Zionists Are Murderers, So Why Are We Prosecuting Those Who Killed Them?'"]

[Text] Since the indictment in the Egypt's Revolution case was announced, people in every house in Egypt, in popular coffee houses, and throughout the country, have been talking about the operations that members of the organization carried out against the Israeli and American presence on Egyptian soil. Despite attempts by the government press in Egypt to defame the organization's members in Egyptian public opinion, the ordinary citizen who followed the news and details of the indictment in the government and opposition newspapers had his own opinion. The following tour among ordinary Egyptians attempts to survey popular reactions and the man in the street's view of the organization called "Egypt's Revolution".

The morning the indictment came out, I was buying some things for the house from a small grocery. The owner of the store, a man from Upper Egypt who had moved to Cairo—his name was Hajj Khalaf Qinaawi—said, commenting on what he had heard, "The presence of the name of Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir among the other members of Egypt's Revolution who killed the Israelis was a great honor."

Hajj Qinaawi also said, "Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir is a young man of the same mettle as his father, who until his dying day fought against those who seized our land in Palestine."

The simple man's words were unequivocal and expressed rejection of the Zionist presence in Egypt. They inspired me to conduct a random inquiry among a number of ordinary citizens, especially young people.

It Is Not Terrorism

I asked the opinion of Ihab Mahmud al-Zallaqi, a student in the Engineering College of Cairo University, where Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir works as an associate professor. He commented, "One should keep in mind that the men of Egypt's Revolution did not aim their rifles at just any Zionist or American; they aimed at Israeli Mosad agents and American CIA men. At the same time, they were careful not to harm a single Egyptian in any of their operations. It is amazing that only a few years ago killing a Zionist was a glorious deed, while today we find some people demanding the execution of 11 Egyptians for the same reason." Comparing what happens in Israel with what happens in Egypt, Ihab said, "Hasn't the Egyptian government seen how Israeli courts gave a suspended sentence of 6 months in prison to one of the Zionist soldiers who burst into al-Aqsa Mosque and killed dozens of Arabs?"

Another point of view was presented by Iman al-'Alimi, a student in the College of Applied Arts. Dealing with the "terrorist" character that Egyptian government newspapers have tried to attach to the men of Egypt's Revolution, he said, "We are all against terrorism, but is killing the enemies of the homeland terrorism? Is killing those who slaughtered children in Bahr al-Baqar terrorism? How can it be terrorism to kill those who raided my village when I was a child of nine? I have read in the newspapers about attempts by the Zionist and American security agencies to kill Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir. Who then is engaging in terrorism? We should listen now to the 'Abd-al-Halim Hafiz song that says, "Your son says to you, O hero, 'Your revolution knows the way, and knows who is the enemy and who the friend.'"

Another example of an ordinary Egyptian's position on Egypt's Revolution was expressed by the worker Hanafi 'Abd-al-'Al from Giza, who said, "The actions of the men of Egypt's Revolution against the Zionist presence in Egypt were a natural reaction to what the Zionist entity is doing in occupied Palestine and to American hegemony over the region. Egypt's Revolution is part of the history of popular resistance to foreign presence on Egyptian soil that we witnessed in the days of the French and British occupations. To the credit of Egypt's Revolution, it performed no action against any Egyptian or Arab. It did not try to overthrow the government, nor does it work for any foreign country. The court must take this into account. The trial of the Egypt's Revolution members should be a trial of the Zionist Mosad and

American intelligence for their criminal actions against the Arab people in occupied Palestine in particular, and against the Arab people in general."

Khalid Mahmud Muhammad, from the al-Kit Kat neighborhood, summed up his point of view about Egypt's Revolution by saying, "What the men of Egypt's Revolution did was a patriotic act deserving commendation. We will never forget our innocent martyrs. History will immortalize the names of the heroes of Egypt's Revolution throughout the ages."

Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Qadir, an insurance company employee, thinks that Egypt's Revolution is a natural extension of the periods of national struggle in which the Egyptian people distinguished themselves in their modern history. Egypt's Revolution exists and has existed for a long time. A rereading of Egyptian history will confirm this, especially the gathering of peasants and young officers around the leader Ahmad 'Urabi, or the gathering of many classes and groups around Sa'd Zaghlul in his revolution. We also find it deeply rooted in the feeling of the patriotic Egyptian intellectuals who gathered around Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid. Afterwards, we find it in the feelings of all the strugglers against forms of foreign presence on Egyptian soil. We also find it in the secret movement of Free Officers who carried out the July Revolution of 1952. Continuing, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Qadir said, "Egypt's Revolution will continue and grow, regardless of what happens from a legal or political point of view. Our reading of the struggle of the Egyptian people confirms that Egypt's revolution continues and will never end."

Egypt, the Mother of Many Children

Nihad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, housewife, is following events. She said she felt sadness when the government press tried to distort the image of Egypt's Revolution in public opinion. She added, "As a housewife, when I read newspaper reports of their actions against the Zionists, I feel pride that Egypt, the mother of many children, cannot for a day forget her real enemies. History will prove that what the men of Egypt's Revolution did is a reflection of the conscience of Arab Egypt."

Amal Kamil, a woman employee in the Ghamrah section of Cairo, talked about the actions of Egypt's Revolution, saying, "I was not surprised when I read the first report about Egypt's Revolution. I had a feeling of security that day, and that hope of our taking revenge against the enemy was still alive. What the men of Egypt's Revolution did was a natural reaction to what the enemies have committed and still are committing against our Arab nation and people in occupied Palestine. Egypt's Revolution confirms again that what was taken by force will be regained only by force, as the leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir said."

'Umar 'Abd-al-Fattah, an employee, thinks that the actions of Egypt's Revolution revived hope within every Egyptian and Arab. "After a period during which we felt that people were resigned to the status quo, Egypt's Revolution came to confirm that the confrontation against the Zionist presence continues, and that there are people able to bear arms to confront the enemy. Although the day of total confrontation may take a long time to come, hope continues to exist."

Sahar Hasan Muhammad, a young woman of twenty living in the Shubra district, says, "Egypt's Revolution can be considered an uprising against the intruders who wanted to pillage our land. It deserves our appreciation and approval. We should stand beside them."

They Said No

At al-Qanatir al-Khayriyyah, Ashraf Muhammad Tal'at, 22 years old, said, "We ought to congratulate the men of Egypt's Revolution who said no to the Zionists and who tell the fraternal Palestinian people that there are men backing it who will take vengeance upon the enemy of us all."

In front of a tall building, I met Uncle Muhammad Diyab, a doorman, and asked him for his opinion about the Egypt's Revolution case. He looked at me for a time. When I was about to repeat the question in different words, I was surprised by his suddenly saying, "Sir, we feel disappointment when we see the Jews beating old Palestinians and children, and no Arab makes a move."

12937

Analysts Discuss Unemployment Problem, Solutions

45040092a Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
25 Mar 88 p 6

[Article by Usamah Saraya]

[Excerpts] The problem of unemployment in Egypt has entered a perilous stage. Indicators based on the 1986 census show that 2 million persons in Egypt are out of work. Each year, 500,000 educated, able and willing persons enter the job market looking for new job opportunities. Current investments and the economic situation in the shadow of economic recession add to the complexity of this problem! Experts voice their opinions with patent candor, saying that the current condition of the job market is worrisome and we are in need of fresh ideas that can save us from the specter of worsening unemployment.

Important questions are on the mind of every family that has a graduate or a member of employable age denied the opportunity to join the world of productive people. This is a multi-dimensional problem which is hard to deal with and must be tackled in stages via short-term and

long-term plans. Furthermore, current job seekers cannot afford to wait, and we must not leave them prey to despair and frustration. Rather, we must set them on the road to work and higher productivity. This is an important question to which the experts give an answer based on figures and current conditions.

Our meetings revealed the real situation in the job market and showed us how we can diagnose the current situation and how to get out of this dilemma. Dr Mukhtar Halludah, director of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics [CAPMAS], puts the facts in numbers, showing that the situation in Egypt is reversed: unemployment among secondary school and university graduates is higher than among illiterates and elementary school graduates. The jobless rate suddenly jumped in 1986 to 14.5 percent of a total work force of 13.799 million workers. The last 1986 census showed that 2 million persons were out of work, while Dr Samir Tubar, chairman of the National Party's economic committee, puts the number of job seekers at 500,000 annually. Professors Fu'ad Hashim and Dr Sabri al-Shabrawi put their fingers on the causes of unemployment and how to get out of it.

How Did the Jobless Rate Jump to 14.5 Percent?

The director of CAPMAS, Dr Mukhtar Halludah, contends that the current state of unemployment is not merely a current problem or a consequence of our time but is rather a cumulative result of past problems and events when the government and the public sector were overburdened, and he contends that masked unemployment is being unveiled. Unemployment rates remained tolerable up until 1985 but experienced a sudden jump in 1986 to 14.7 percent of the work force. The figures for 1987 show that it stood at 11.5 percent, reflecting not a drop in the rate but rather a different method of calculating the size of the actual work force in the market.

How Do We Deal With the Current Job Market Situation?

The director of CAPMAS answers this question by saying that figures reveal a strange situation unparalleled anywhere in the world, reflected in the fact that the highest unemployment rate is reversed. The jobless rate is highest among secondary school and university graduates and lowest among illiterates and elementary school graduates. We need a change to put the educated people to work and put an end to their joblessness, even if they have to go outside their usual positions or qualifications, for educated people should be able to find work before others do. Although this change does not alter the current unemployment crisis, it helps to promote production and, consequently, raise the market's economic and absorptive capacity. It is better, for instance, to have an educated traffic policeman performing his job efficiently. The same thing is true of other sectors and services, where efficiency is lacking in certain production

fields that suffer from low efficiency and masked joblessness. High quality and good management reduce waste and enhance values. Consequently, the production process logic, or qualitative and quantitative production growth, will prevail and the ability to meet domestic and international market demands will be realized, as will the awareness that the current market is not only domestic, for the overall production is being compared to that of the world market.

But the current rampant unemployment crisis calls for the creation of new jobs and new unconventional remedies in order to absorb large numbers of jobless workers.

Dr Halludah offers several solutions and proposals for a quick remedy, summed up as follows:

An idea has been raised to export large numbers of Egyptian workers to Arab and foreign markets, but we need an institutional organization to take on this task so that Egyptian workers may be granted their rights and be given a relative advantage in the face of the stiff competition from Asian labor markets. This step should begin by studying regional and international labor market demands. Egypt has highly-qualified job training institutions, most notably perhaps the labor university and various other retraining centers able to train the unemployed in skills needed in the labor export markets.

As for new investments, small industries are the way to go for absorbing the jobless work force. We need to coordinate with the various ministries and make great efforts in this regard by granting preferred loans and adopting an innovative marketing policy to promote and enhance production. The Ministry of Industry and Agriculture ought to plan a great number of these small projects that can be tied together under a cooperative corporation to put out a complete product fit for export and local marketing, and ought to establish professional marketing companies to serve producers and main production levels.

Moreover, the new cities provide a marvelous opportunity for accommodating large number of jobless workers. This can only be realized if these cities take advantage of the opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency and domestic growth, for they are still dependent on Cairo for their needs and services. When they get the opportunity to be self-sufficient, they will have a great number of formidable job opportunities that will attract the unemployed to their major production and services sectors for the production cycle will create an interlinked chain of jobs. All this, however, requires a quick tempo and radical reaction which is possible to realize if we get rid of the current slow tempo and concentrate on quality, lower prices, and even variety, tying these goals together rather than separating them as used to be the case. As for quantity or quality, Egyptian production must be exported or, in other words, be subjected to stiff competition by advance production markets that fulfill all the qualities of the production process.

Dr Fu'ad Hashim says that an immediate solution is difficult and inconsistent with the magnitude of the problem. However, we have to proceed on this path by providing employment for the jobless youth in new construction projects, giving them greater opportunities for land ownership and reclamation and employing large numbers in infrastructure projects, especially road construction. Moreover, giving priority to small projects helps to alleviate the impact of unemployment, particularly with regard to resource development and tourist projects to be added to the tourism map which has room for several tourist sites in Sinai, the Red Sea coast and Upper Egypt. These projects require large numbers of workers but not large investments. The state and the banks can finance the purchase of the needed simple and easy-to-use equipment and the provision of needed limited investments will contribute to higher employment, greater output and stability.

As for studying the causes of the unemployment crisis and drawing up a long-term plan to eradicate it for good, we have to realize that unemployment comes and goes with the rate of growth in society, the type of growth, the strategies which are followed, and the educational system. That is, unemployment is linked to four major factors: the rate of growth, meaning the investment of the natural and economic resources of society and in proportion to that rate, work opportunities to work become available. If we are currently experiencing a period of recession caused by economic development in recent years...then it means that job opportunities are diminishing. The same thing goes for the type of growth: is it growth in basic or service sectors that have different labor needs? And do the development strategies include projects that depend heavily on labor or on advanced technology? We finally come to the fourth factor, namely education: does it provide expertise that can keep up with the needs of the development plan? We in Egypt, in light of economic development, need to set policies that integrate the aforementioned factors in a way consistent with our economic circumstances and the growth of the labor force, particularly in the field of education. We must also adopt the educational policy Dr Ahmad Fathi Surur is now drafting which ties education to societal circumstances, in addition to production strategies aimed at projects that rely heavily on labor and in addition to reducing automation in our projects except for those minimally tied to production technology. Small industries cater to this trend, as do numerous food and services industries. In other words, we are ultimately calling for a reexamination of the development plan and its priorities.

12502

Columnist Discusses Nature of Public Sector Debate

45040106a Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
9 Mar 88 p 14

["Idea" Column by Mustafa Amin]

[Text] We have not demanded abolition of the private sector, but have instead demanded that this sector be reformed. We have demanded that the losing sector be

turned into a working sector. It is unreasonable for us to remain silent when we learn from the official statistics that the public sector worker's productivity is 13,000 pounds whereas the private sector worker's productivity is 56,000 pounds and that a pound's productivity in the public sector is 6 pounds whereas a pound's productivity in the private sector is 26 pounds.

The disagreement is not between right and left, but between those demanding reform and those advocating that the flawed status quo be maintained. Those who want to fight corruption, excessiveness, and poor production are foes of the 23 July revolution, whereas those who defend the losses, glorify immobility, and welcome bankruptcy are the revolution's supporters and defenders!

They forget that the public sector companies belong to the people, not to the government, that when a company loses the people incur the cost of the losses, and that, therefore, the people are entitled to object, to debate, and to demand that an end be put to tampering with the people's money and undermining the people's property. Those who defend the faults existing in some public sector companies are the people who benefit from these faults, the people who manage the losing companies, and the people who borrow from banks to reward themselves generously. We have heard of no company in the world that rewards its manager for losing so many million pounds. Those who defend continuation of the status quo are not interested in redoubling the private sector's profits, but in redoubling the monies that end up in their pockets.

Those who say that the disagreement is between capitalism and socialism insult socialism. Socialism rejects losing companies, mismanagement, idleness and negligence, and the purchase of new equipment for no reason other than the collection of middleman's fees. Look at what Gorbachev has done in the Soviet Union. He rescued the Soviet economy from ruin when he increased the number of private companies and projects and encouraged competition between government and private companies. He has even announced that more than 300,000 people are now engaged in free economic enterprises.

Patriotism is not bankruptcy. It does not mean that the people should die of starvation or that governments should be drowned in debts. Patriotism means that I should produce more, that I should protect every penny of my country's wealth and should fight corruption, graft, and the misuse of power.

As for those who defend immobility, support shackles, and refuse to open the windows, they are the ones who imagine that the only way to revive one-man rule is for Egypt to go bankrupt and for the Egyptian people to starve. They imagine that consequently the voices will rise to demand the return of the gallows, detention camps, and oversight.

It is a struggle between the supporters of bankruptcy and the supporters of prosperity.

08494

Opposition Leaders Discuss Negotiations With Government

45040103a London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
8 Apr 88 pp 24-25

[Article by Usamah 'Ajaj]

[Text] Nobody knows specifically the real reason which prompted the leaders of the National Democratic Party in Egypt to invite the other, opposition parties—the Wafd, NPUG, the Labor-Muslim Brothers Alliance and the Liberals, and the Ummah Party along with them—to a national dialogue. Is it the economic and political crisis Egypt is going through, which everyone now must join efforts to solve? Or is it the crisis of the National Party itself, and one force or axis (and how many of them there are!) pursuing individual judgment on propounding the matter of dialogue as a way to a solution? Whatever the reasons are, that does not rule out the possibility that political controversy has once again assumed its sharpest form on the Egyptian political stage, and, with it, the game of “tug of war” between the ruling party and the opposition parties has resumed, now that these parties have placed the concerns over democracy in Egypt at the head of the subjects of the dialogue and have clearly and frankly demanded that the government and party give up extending the force of the emergency law.

Has the government agreed to the opposition's demand to suspend the force of the emergency law, or not?

Someone monitoring Egyptian political life will certainly easily discover that the platform of national dialogue which the political forces in the form of the opposition and the ruling party are calling for is a method to which Egyptian political activity was not previously accustomed. When President Husni Mubarak assumed power at the end of 1981, he called for a national dialogue on ways of remedying the economic problem in Egypt, and a national conference on this topic was held in the first half of 1982. This dialogue was not asked to come up with a “magic prescription” to remedy the economic problem, but rather to come up with a minimum agreement on the description of the economic crisis and a minimum of agreement on means for a solution. In spite of the dialogue's success in presenting views from the various political schools frankly and clearly, that did not prompt any cabinet to embrace the conclusions of this dialogue, and its recommendations dissipated with the winds. The political currents so lost their enthusiasm for such dialogue that President Husni Mubarak assigned a social action leader, Dr Ahmad Khalifah, who was a former minister of social affairs, to prepare for a national

dialogue on the social problems of Egypt along the lines of the previous dialogue itself, but the conference has not yet been held, although it was called for more than 5 whole years ago.

It may appear that there has been real surprise that application of the approach of national dialogue has been repeated, especially since those calling for it this time are the leaders of the National Party themselves. Yasin Siraj-al-Din, the leader of the Wafd opposition in the People's Assembly, revealed the preliminaries of the invitation and said, “At the special committee to reply to the government declaration, Kamal al-Shadhili, secretary of organization in the National Party and assistant secretary general of the ruling party, presented an invitation to a national dialogue during the talk about the government declaration. The Wafd, represented by me, as well as Ibrahim Shukri, the chairman of the Labor Party and member of the special committee to reply to the government declaration, responded. Other signals were repeated by Kamal al-Shadhili during the discussions, and Dr Yusuf Wali, secretary general of the National Party, intervened and held concentrated consultations with the various parties, after which agreement was reached on the first session of dialogue between the National Party and the opposition parties. From the beginning, the opposition presented two basic conditions for beginning the dialogue:

“1. Discussion of the issue of democracy and public freedoms as a focal issue, after which dialogue could be held on the issues the National Party is presenting, which Dr Yusuf Wali has declared. These are educational policy, prices, wages, health, the environment, and subsidies.

“2. The opposition would also have the right to present any other subjects it considered to be of importance in the national dialogue.”

Yasin Siraj-al-Din, leader of the Wafd opposition, revealed what went on at the first meeting and said, “We frankly declared that it was necessary that the National Party and the government announce the non-renewal of the emergency law whose force will end at the end of April 1988, as a pledge to establish goodwill and a start on the dialogue on the issue of freedoms, followed by the subjects presented by the National Party. The first meeting ended with Dr Yusuf Wali's declaration that he and the committee formed for the dialogue from the National Party, which consisted of the assistant secretaries Kamal al-Shadhili, Safwat al-Sharif, the minister of information, and Dr Ahmad Salamah, the minister of state for People's and Consultative Assembly affairs, would present the opposition's demand to the party's political leadership, because it was not an element of their authority alone, nor their right, to make that kind of decision by themselves.”

The second meeting began with a real crisis, which was that Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din excused himself from attending, because the invitation had not been directed to him, in his capacity as chairman of the Wafd Party, by the chairman of the National Party, President Husni Mubarak. The second crisis came when after agreement between Dr Yusuf Wali and Ibrahim Shukri and Yasin Siraj-al-Din to invite Dr 'Atif Sidqi to attend the dialogue, after President Mubarak's agreement to that, Ibrahim Shukri presented the invitation, especially since the meeting was to convene at his home. However, Dr Sidqi in anger excused himself from attending the dialogue, after 'Adil Husayn, the editor in chief of AL-SHA'B newspaper, the organ of the Labor Party, had attacked him and accused him of restricting his attention to issues of an economic character alone.

AL-HAWADITH has learned that at the second meeting a discussion of the subject of the emergency law took place in a broader form, and the leaders of the opposition stressed their insistence on termination of the force of the law, while presenting the reasons which called for that. These were embodied in the coverage by the law on procedures and current laws of acts which are considered felonies, including cases of terrorism, and the possession by the Egyptian judiciary and prosecutor's office of guarantees which help provide the desired security and stabilization of the security situation — on top of which the continued force of the emergency law for 7 years after al-Sadat's assassination at the incident of the podium made the law an ordinary, non-exceptional one, constituted restrictions and a threat to political, social and economic freedoms and led to Arab and foreign capital's anxiety about participating in development. The NPUG had reservations about this final reason.

Part of Dr Yusuf Wali's response was that he would present the matter to the National Party's political leadership and that the emergency law was the subject of a study on the part of officials which dealt with the extent to which it was possible to respond to the opposition's demand. Dr Wali also stressed a decision by President Mubarak to hold an enlarged meeting with the leaders and editors in chief of the opposition papers as soon as he finished receiving some leaders and figures visiting Egypt. The opposition requested that the declaration of the party's response not take a long time and that this announcement be made at the third session of the dialogue, which was to be held in the home of Mustafa Kamil Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party.

Dr Hilmi Murad, the secretary general of the Socialist Labor Party, referred to the reasons which had prompted the opposition to insist on suspension of the force of the emergency law and the non-extension of its force and said, "When the emergency law went into effect 7 years ago, after the incident of the podium, it was said at the time that the force of the law would last only a number of months, to ascertain the dimensions of the incident of the podium and whether it had hidden aspects or there were foreign bodies behind it. It was the government's

promise that the force of the law would not last a whole year, as the People's Assembly had agreed at that time. Since that date the government has been extending the emergency law year after year. The last time, its force was extended for 2 years. The imposition of the state of emergency quoted in the law is restrictive in form and can be summarized by the outbreak of actual war, the existence of the possibility of entering an imminent war, the outbreak of factional or civil strife or the outbreak of disasters or plagues. God be praised, none of the four reasons which call for a state of emergency exist in Egypt. However, the force of the law has been reaffirmed on the pretext of confronting armed terrorism, although no use has been made of the emergency law in confronting any of the incidents which have been labelled armed terrorism, such as the attempts to assassinate al-Nabawi Isma'il, Hasan Abu-Basha and Makram Muhammad Ahmad, although hundreds were arrested in the scope of the investigations regarding this case."

Dr Hilmi Murad believed that what makes this law serious is that its uses in the past period did not amount to more than arbitrary arrests and the arrest of 'Ayn Shams University students when they organized a march in support of the Palestinian uprising. Dr Muhammad al-Sayyid Habib and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi were prohibited from traveling to the governorates of the republic and aggression was committed against Dr 'Isam al-'Aryan by a police officer and against three members of the People's Assembly, who are supposed to enjoy parliamentary immunity. Kamal Khalid the lawyer pointed to some improper specific applications of the emergency law and said, "What has been called hostage-taking made its appearance recently; when the police did not find the person whose arrest was sought, it arrested another hostage in order to put pressure on the wanted person to come forward. This inhumane prerogative which the security agencies engage in is stipulated in Article Three of the emergency law, and this law places the power of policemen above that of the public prosecutor. In the context of the suspension of the force of the law on procedures and the guarantees it provides to ordinary persons, persons arrested by the emergency law have the right to talk only after the passage of 30 days, and it has arranged for an appeal of any decree releasing them on behalf of the minister of the interior, after the judiciary determines a session in accordance with what is feasible for the judiciary. Even if the judiciary issues a decree releasing the prisoner, the minister of the interior has the right to appeal the decree within 15 days. The judiciary often orders the release a second time, rejecting the ministry's appeal, and the police agencies resort to issuing an arrest decree after the prisoner has been released on paper. Sometimes they are arrested before leaving the building of the prosecutor's office. The emergency law gives the authorities the power to arrest anyone on the argument that he is a threat to security; in that case the arrest of persons could continue for a period of 6 months in accordance with a memorandum of investigations by the security agencies."

The question which arises before observation of the parties' position in the event the government rejects their request that the emergency law not be extended is the secret behind the National Party's presentation of the call for a national dialogue. Yasin Siraj-al-Din said "The study of the timing of the declaration of the dialogue and the secret of the National Party's request of it was made at opposition party meetings, and two alternatives were presented and assumed:

"It could have been a maneuver on the part of the National Party to invite the opposition parties to a dialogue on grounds that the parties would reject it, after which defaming the opposition would become an easy matter. Our acceptance of the dialogue caused the opportunity to be lost, if there had been an intent to maneuver, and perhaps we could be successful in abrogating the emergency law, which would provide a broad opportunity for the exercise of democracy and political freedoms in Egypt.

"The second matter was that the National Party might have been serious in seeking the aid of the opposition now that the economic situation has gone far to assume the status of crisis."

Lutfi Wakid, the secretary of the central committee of the NPUG, expressed reservations, considering the dialogue a way by which the National Party could emerge from its crisis. He said, "I cannot build my position on an assumption, since the National Party could perhaps be in need of something greater and broader than dialogue. The crisis might be one of the National Party—indeed, it is a general crisis, in which the parties and all the political forces share. In my belief, it is trivializing things to consider that the party's request for a dialogue emerged from its feeling of crisis. That is the same false approach indicated by the statement that a 'National Party' request for a dialogue is part of the struggle of the forces within it. We do not know the centers of strength and weakness inside the National Party, but what we do observe is that the people participating in the dialogue, the secretary general and the assistant secretaries, are in mutual agreement on all issues."

Lutfi Wakid denied that the opposition had abandoned all its demands at the 'Abidin conference last February, and said, "All dialogues consist of reciprocal presentations by the parties to the dialogue. The National Party presented a number of issues and the opposition presented the issue of democracy. This issue has an urgent, specific characteristic, which is the need that a position on it be defined in April. There is a second issue which seems urgent, which is the law on the election of local governments. Will that be by absolute lists or by a return to individual districts? This is because the elections of local governments will be held this year and it is necessary that the technique of pressure or 'arm-twisting' not be present in any dialogue, but rather a desire for mutual understanding, and not an effort to impose will. As to the February 1987 resolutions, they were a general

agreement within the opposition which it is possible to struggle to attain over a long time, and it is not necessary that we impose it by a single resolution."

Yasin Siraj-al-Din also denied that the opposition had abandoned its previous requests, and said, "We have requested that the response to the demand for the non-extension of the emergency law be a pledge of the government's good will in responding to the remaining demands or some of them, but as a basis in principle, the demand bearing on the emergency law." However, Yasin Siraj-al-Din along with others observed that there were disputes within the National Party and said "my sense from a distance and my political instinct indicate that there is more than one tendency within the National Party, a hard-line orientation some of which is declared in the words of the people following it and some of which is not declared, working under the table, and a less hard-line orientation or one inclined to meet some opposition demands, because success in the dialogue will be a success for the National Party, especially since it has lost great ground through its positions against democracy."

Lutfi Wakid noted that some progress had been made, by saying, "We have received a promise that no alternative to the emergency law would exist. We were informed of this after word had gotten around that a law on terrorism was being discussed and that there was an effort to have it constitute an alternative to the emergency law. The seriousness of such behavior is that the new law will be permanent, not exceptional. Some people asserted that the discussion revolved around the renewal or non-renewal of the emergency law. If we are in agreement that we are a country in which resolutions play a great role, and there is a distinction among positions even within the institutions of power, it is then unacceptable that the answer on the position on the emergency be made overnight."

Concerning the point on the alienation of some forces which have been deprived of legitimate status in the dialogue, by which we mean the Nasserists and the Marxists, especially since the Muslim Brothers are taking part in the dialogue through the alliance party, Counselor Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, a leader of the Brothers, is a participant in the dialogue. Lutfi Wakid said, "When there is the NPUG, which has no delegation from anyone, it must be a representative of all the forces of the left. Although not all the forces are present or included in the NPUG, the left cannot take a position that conflicts with or contradicts the NPUG, and in the forefront of the forces of the left are the Nasserists. We are not far from the Nasserists and they are not far from us. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din and I are in the forefront of the Nasserists and among the vanguard of the free officers."

Yasin Siraj-al-Din had reservations about the possibility of success for the dialogue and said, "I was inclined to optimism until the issuance of the statement by the minister of the interior, in which he declared that it was

necessary to renew the law. This is not an encouraging sign, especially since no statement has been issued by Dr Wali or 'Atif Sidqi contradicting what the minister said." Yasin Siraj-al-Din continued, "At the meeting of the higher board of the Wafd at its meeting on 10 March, we resolved that if the government of the National Party has not responded to this demand, we will sever the dialogue, which has not been completed, and will not take part in any dialogue or any issue presented, because all reform must begin in the framework of a democratic atmosphere."

Lutfi Wakid warned of the failure to respond to the opposition demand and the effect of that on the entire political situation, because all the restrictions the government has set on legitimate and legal practice are, as he said, new doors through which illegitimate practice and terrorism can penetrate, and any lessening of the status of legitimate political activity will open new doors to extremism.

Ibrahim Shukri, the chairman of the Labor Party, is one of those who are pessimistic about success for this dialogue and said, "All the recent evidence and positions stress that there is a possibility that the dialogue will be thwarted, and no glimmers of the government's response to the opposition's demand to halt the force of the emergency law are on the horizon. What happened with the member of the People's Assembly from the Labor Party, Dr 'Isam al-Aryan, and the aggression by a police officer against him, is sufficient. This matter will not go by easily."

Note: The People's Assembly approved the extension of the force of the emergency law at the session held on 20 March 1988. 11887

KUWAIT

Minister of Finance Discusses Investment Activities Abroad, Economic Policies

44040196 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
8 Apr 88 p 19

[Interview with Jasim Muhammad al-Khurafi, Kuwait's minister of finance: "Jasim Muhammad al-Khurafi, Kuwait's Finance Minister, Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'The Dinar Has Not Been Affected by the Decline in the Price of the Dollar';" in the minister's office at the Ministry of Finance; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Jasim al-Khurafi is an Arab minister of finance who keeps himself abreast of whatever is contemporary and new in his age. He keeps himself abreast of the age's changing assumptions as well as its marvels and deceptions. He is one of those ministers who applies himself to all the circumstances of the age, and he does so knowledgeably, proficiently, with presence of mind, persistent resolve, and a far-reaching anticipation of the future. He is thus able to do something about protecting the interests of his people and his state.

AL-HAWADITH had an appointment with him this week, and this interview was conducted with him in his office in the Ministry of Finance.

[Question] The level of spending in Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] countries usually reflects oil revenues in those countries. Although these oil revenues have declined in general, the budget which Kuwait adopted for fiscal year 1987-1988 was somewhat expansionary. Did this policy succeed in improving the performance of the country's economy?

[Answer] I am not qualified to speak on behalf of the Gulf states. But as far as Kuwait is concerned, the growth in its spending budget was considerable even when we had a financial surplus from oil. The spending budget became inflated, and that was caused by surplus revenues. This is particularly evident when we compare Kuwait's budget in the early seventies, when expenditures were 300 million dinars, with today's expenditures, which exceed 3 billion dinars. This increase, of course, is due to increased revenues. Because of the deficit we started by evaluating conditions for the budget, and we concentrated on reducing any increases in this cumulative budget growth. But, of course, we did not touch anything that would affect citizens' prosperity, such as salary increases. Nor did we touch the special services sector, such as education and health. That is why we concentrated on making the budget serve as a tool that could set the local cycle in motion. And, thank God, I believe that everything will turn out all right.

[Question] The setback suffered by Arab investments abroad as a result of the collapse of international financial markets last year must have hurt Kuwaiti investments also. Is it now possible to limit the growth of these losses? Does Kuwait expect American stock markets to correct that situation any time soon?

[Answer] I answered that question on more than one occasion. Today, I am affirming that investments in Kuwait are somewhat different. This is because they are old. Our method has been to determine which is the lower price: the market price or the cost. We lost in theory because we failed to realize the profit we could have realized. But, thank God, the market price of our investments is still above the cost price.

[Question] The decline in the value of the dollar had a limited impact on Kuwait, compared with the impact it had on other GCC countries. This is because the dinar is tied to a currency basket and not just to the dollar. We noticed, however, that recently monetary authorities have been encouraging the separation of the dinar from the rate of exchange for the dollar. Does this mean that the flow of Kuwaiti funds abroad will be temporarily halted so that once again Kuwaiti funds which are deposited abroad can be brought back into the country? Or does it mean that all ties between the dinar and the

dollar are completely severed? In this case, does Kuwait support the idea of tying the dinar and Gulf currencies in general to a currency basket and to values which include both gold and oil?

[Answer] There is no doubt that American markets are the foundation for world markets. The problem of American markets has to do with America's policy regarding the existing deficit. I believe that the dollar will continue to remain unstable, and I believe that no decisive measures will be taken to reduce the deficit, especially since Americans are going through a presidential election. Consequently, decisive decisions might be difficult in such a stage. As a citizen of the Gulf I hope to see Gulf states enjoying the benefits of a common market in the Gulf. The goals of the economic agreement were established so that we can make that happen. Their excellencies and their highnesses, the leaders of GCC countries, want this plan to materialize. They want everyone to approve the economic agreement, which is making progress, albeit slowly. It has been established that these are crucial matters. We must proceed gradually with this, and we must become convinced that these matters must be implemented. I believe that when our interests are tied together, everything we want will be achieved.

Your question, of course, is a lengthy one, and analysis will be required to answer each part. But I will give you a general answer. Kuwait pursued a wise policy when it tied its currency to a currency basket; it turned out to be a very useful policy, thank God.

We were not directly affected by the decline in the value of the dollar in relation to the dinar. The main effect of the dollar's decline has been on our income, which is based on oil revenues. It is a known fact that oil revenues are based on the value of the dollar. That is the source of the link between the dollar and the dinar.

I hope the price of oil will be determined in terms of a currency basket, and I hope there is a clear idea about determining a new rate of exchange for the dollar based on a currency basket. This approach has advantages as well as disadvantages.

With regard to GCC countries, let me repeat what I said about the economic agreement. One of the goals of that agreement is to achieve some day, God willing, a uniform currency for the Gulf. We have to start making full preparations for such an accomplishment, and that is tantamount to laying down a common foundation of stability for the GCC countries.

[Question] Is it possible to do this, and can it be done quickly?

[Answer] Yes, if intentions are good and if everyone is concerned about the general interest. A journey of 1,000 miles begins with 1 step.

[Question] When the government of Kuwait borrowed funds from the local market to cover part of the budget deficit, it took a step that was unique in the economy of the Gulf. Does the Kuwaiti government expect to cover all the deficit from domestic financial resources, or does it expect to withdraw funds from its foreign reserves? What are the anticipated deficit figures for the coming fiscal year?

[Answer] In all cases when there is a deficit, funds have to be withdrawn from the general reserve. According to the law, reserve funds are used not only to cover the deficit, but also to give the Central Bank an opportunity to control local monetary policy. That is why we are extremely careful about having a complete picture of the monetary policy in our minds so that local currency conditions can be brought under control on the basis of that assumption. With regard to the deficit, I expect this year's deficit to be the same as last year's: that is, 1.3 billion dinars.

[Question] Do we have to insist that the price for a barrel of oil be 32 dollars? Can we live with a price tag of 16 or 18 dollars?

[Answer] First of all, the 16 dollars figure and the 32 dollars figure are not normal. Unfortunately, we were the ones who provided the opportunity for such a disparity in price. When the price of a barrel of oil rose, we did not consider the possibility of finding energy alternatives. Countries whose oil production costs are high entered the production market when the price rose. Evidence for this lies in the fact that OPEC countries used to produce 30 million barrels of oil a day. Now when we talk about producing 17 million barrels of oil, all that [discrepancy] does not reflect energy conservation.

[Question] Kuwait's investment policy abroad is considered to be a leading policy that is expanding continuously. Is it possible to say today that returns on these investments are now equal to oil revenues. What is the ratio of these returns to oil revenues?

[Answer] The Emir of Kuwait is the one who deserves credit for the investment policy. His Highness is the one who came up with the idea for it when he was minister of finance. He developed a clear outline for the policy so that revenues from these investments would go into the general reserve.

[Question] We've noticed that Kuwait's investment policy abroad is creating hard feelings in some economic and financial circles in those countries where the investments are made. (That happened recently with regard to Kuwait's shares in the British Petroleum Company.) Do you think these hard feelings might be attributable to politicians who are interested in keeping Arab financial influence out of world markets?

[Answer] Let me assure you that nothing can be further from Kuwait's mind than becoming involved in any sensitive issue. In these circles subjects are sometimes discussed, and the discussions may be used for political purposes. Then we find ourselves unwittingly or inadvertently involved in these matters.

[Question] What effect has the Gulf war had on local economic activity, particularly commercial activity?

[Answer] The effect has been quite considerable. I believe that the loss which has been incurred is not a material loss. I believe that one can always make up for a material loss. But it is seeing brothers killing each other and shedding each other's blood that is painful. We pray that God Almighty will show the feuding parties the way to end this vicious war.

[Question] Is the IMF carrying out its obligations and responsibilities?

[Answer] Unfortunately not. I believe the IMF is making many mistakes. It is setting down very harsh conditions for the economic problems that fraternal Arab countries have to deal with. The IMF has to take into account the difficult conditions that some countries have. We have to be aware of our responsibility, and we have to correct anything that may have been neglected. We must not allow the superpowers to become the only ones steering the IMF and using it to remedy their own problems only, not those of the rest of the world, especially the problems of Third World countries.

08592

Possibility of Bank Merger Addressed

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Apr 88 p 31

[Shaykh Salim 'Abd-al-Aziz al-Sabah, director-general of the Kuwaiti Central Bank, addresses the possibility of merging Kuwaiti banks.]

[Excerpts] With regard to the possibility of merging Kuwaiti banks, Shaykh al-Sabah said: The positive aspects of merging some local banks lie in the fact that large scale economies have certain advantages and in the fact that such a merger can produce an economic boom which would benefit the banks in question as well as the economy as a whole. As director-general of the Central Bank, he expects the performance rate of the economy to improve considerably, especially since the banks, once their demanding loan program has been completed, will be able to devote their full attention to servicing domestic financial needs. He also said: The circumstances which the Kuwaiti economy experienced in past years have caused individuals in the private sector to fundamentally change their concept of investment. Thus, investors have become primarily concerned with activities of real growth; in addition, these individuals are clearly inclined to utilize their financial resources more profitably.

LEBANON

London Meeting Discusses Domestic Political Conditions

*44040172b London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
2-8 Apr 88 pp 24, 25*

[Article by Yusuf Khazim]

[Text] The Lebanese issue, with all its political, economic and social dimensions and ramifications, yielded to talk at a conference which the Center of Lebanese Studies, Oxford, organized in London in cooperation with the Center of Near and Middle East Studies at London University's Faculty of Oriental and African Studies.

Attending this conference, whose activities concluded on 19 March, were political, economic and diplomatic figures in addition to a large number of academics and people from the media, each one participating, as a lecturer, discussant or listener, in dealing with the issue of modern Lebanon.

The activities of the conference were divided into eight areas of research, which dealt with Lebanese economic, social and economic concerns in their local, regional and international guises.

Nadim Shahadah (director of the Center of the Center of Lebanese Studies) and Dr Tony Allen (director of the Center of Near and Middle East Studies, London) were presented to the conference, and Prof Michel Gilsenan, Dr Paul Khallat, Dr Yusuf al-Sayigh and Qasim Ja'far headed the conference's sessions.

The Lebanese Experience

The first lecture was by Dr Nasir al-Sa'idi, who dealt with Lebanon's transition from the stage of a low rate of inflation in the period before 1975, the year of the beginning of the war, to the stage of a rise in the rate of inflation and collapse of the exchange rates in the eighties, when this period of inflation was accompanied by a state of recession and a severe crisis in the Lebanese economy.

Dr al-Sa'idi, in his study, addressed himself to the basic elements of inflation and the drop in the exchange rate, which he spelled out as follows:

The government budget deficit.

The decline in real economic activity.

Fiscal policy.

The role of future expectations regarding inflation rates and changes in the exchange rate.

He went on to point out that these expectations generally adapted themselves to the general state of the economy, which included the development of financial and commercial variables, which were dependent on possibilities for the performance of economic reforms and political settlements. In addition, new information which affects future financial expectations has great, dramatic effect on the current value of the exchange rate and the rate of inflation.

Ilyas Saba's Expectations

In his study, the former Lebanese minister of finance, Dr Ilyas Saba (who was appointed minister in 1970, in the "youth cabinet" Premier Sa'ib Salam formed, the cabinet of former President Sulayman Franjiyah's first term), dealt with the numerous problems which have brought the current Lebanese economic system to the state it is in. These are in particular concentrated in the two problems of the sudden rapid growth of the relative magnitude of the public sector and the growth and increase in the importance of the parallel economy, that is, the economy the warring militias dominate.

Dr Saba pointed to the main causes of the illness in the Lebanese economy, refusing to take for granted the belief prevailing in local economic circles that the war is the only cause of this crisis, that with the end of this war everything will return to its past state and that a hidden hand will return things to their proper place.

By carrying out an analysis of the Lebanese economic situation since the beginning of the Lebanese war on 13 April 1975, we can see clearly that internal factors and the quality of the leaders making political decisions were responsible for the aggravation and escalation of the effects of the negative foreign factors.

Dr Ilyas Saba went on to stress that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 constituted a turning point in the course of the Lebanese economy during the war. It appears clear that the year 1984 was the beginning of the great economic deterioration and that the starting point of economic, and even political, salvation will be the liberation of the country from the grip of the "war commanders" who began their dominance of it in 1982. The foreseeable opportunity for starting this process of salvation is the summer of 1988, with the start of the process of the maturation of the presidential term.

The Social Dimension

Salim Nasr in his research work dealt with "the social dimension of the Lebanese war," analyzing the dynamic of the social economy, the domestic rearrangements from the Lebanese war and the dimensions of the social breakdown of the war system in Lebanon. He brought his research together under these headings:

Nasr dealt specifically with the following subjects:

The tangible bases of the extended conflict, how correspondence or congruence occurred between the war and the ongoing confrontation with economic prosperity and the modest improvement in the standard of living during the first 7 years of war, and why Lebanon has just been witnessing economic collapse during the past 2 years.

Salim Nasr in his discussion dealt with the problem of social fragmentation the war brought to the fore and analyzed the consequences of it in the context of the reconstruction of Lebanese society. He also observed that a number of socioeconomic changes appeared during the war, most important of which were:

The resident population's failure to increase in numbers.

The increase in the number of emigrants "in permanent fashion."

The redrawing of the country's social geography through the compulsory uprooting of the population.

The emergence of the demographic rearrangement of regions.

The reconstitution of the bourgeois class.

The decline of the middle class and the classes of specialized workforce and their replacement by the "war society."

The Impossible Solutions

In his study Dr Ghassan Salamah (professor lecturer at the French Sorbonne University) dealt with "the warring parties' current plans for solutions" and said that the plan the Lebanese president Amin al-Jumayyil presented in February 1988 to Syria and its Lebanese allies through the American government was another attempt to narrow the gap among the various positions regarding the future of the Lebanese political system. A large number of the recommendations the politicians or their go-betweens presented were exchanged among Beirut, Damascus, Ba'abda and Ra's Beirut, especially after the collapse of the tripartite agreement which was signed in Damascus in 1985.

Dr Ghassan Salamah went on to point out that these various recommendations indicated three things:

1. A minimum of agreement has not yet been reached.

2. The three "nice-sounding" agreements which have been reached so far are not acceptable to some parties (the constitutional document of 1976, Karami's ministerial statement, 1984, and the tripartite agreement, 1985).

3. The lines of communication have not yet been severed among the parties that are fighting and struggling on the Lebanese stage. A close look at these various plans will

show that the gap has been narrowed on a number of questions and the possibility of conciliation has been facilitated with respect to other questions, while bearing in mind that behind these plans there is movement for a change in the internal balance of forces and for the Syrian role in fashioning or failing to fashion Lebanon's political system.

The Presidential Institution

Dr Nawwaf Salam dealt with the subject of "the institution of the presidency in Lebanon in the light of the coming elections." He reviewed the benefits of the constitutional presidency and the actual restrictions imposed upon it; from this it is apparent that the presidency still is without a doubt the strongest political institution in Lebanon. The executive power is in the hands of the presidency, which exercises great influence on parliament. In spite of that, the dominance of the presidency as an institution raises a constitutional problem related to balance and harmony among the various institutions of the government as well as presenting a political question related to the delicate distribution of power among factions. Therefore, redefining the benefits of the presidency, in addition to the powers of the office of prime minister and the chairman of the chamber of deputies, has become the central issue among the various ideological premises which have been presented since 1975 to arrive at "national elections."

Dr Salam concluded his lecture by wondering about the possibility of coming up with a new equation for the strategy of power in the political process leading to the delicate presidential elections in the summer of 1988, which will constitute a rare opportunity for change in Lebanon.

The International View

Dr Phillip Windsor dealt with the subject of modern Lebanon from the international viewpoint. He began his study by pointing out that "it is difficult to discriminate between international views and regional views on Lebanon. The partial explanation for the reason for that is that the regional considerations in the existing ideologies in the orient are also international ones. The fact is that regional conditions generate international conditions to an extremely large degree."

Dr Windsor continued, "Lebanon for a long period constituted a center for Syrian-Israeli competition and for the competition between the two great powers connected to that, as well as being a basic point when discussing the future of the Palestinians. However, this latter distinction might now be shifting to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This means that the recent developments in the occupied territories will constitute a victory for the internal structure of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation at the expense of the political structure of the

various forces in the Palestine Liberation Organization, which are still to a large degree fighting within the Lebanese-Syrian framework."

Windsor added, "These all constitute surface features of an issue with deeper roots. Lebanon, with its free press and its ideologically and politically divided society, was and still is the arena of the struggle of the major political movements inside and outside the Arab world, especially in the context of the struggle with Iran on the one hand and Israel on the other. However, because of the complexity of Lebanese politics and the social and religious wreckage within this country at the hand of foreign forces, Lebanon itself as a structure began to grow impotent and at the same time the rifts which at one time were a characteristic of the Arab cold war became prominent."

Dr Windsor concluded his lecture by considering that the holding of an international conference to resolve the Middle East issue was far fetched. In the event such a conference were held, it would not be able to create the suitable atmosphere for resolving the Lebanese issue because of the regional and international struggle inside Lebanon.

The Syrian Role

Dr Elizabeth Picard talked about Syrian strategy in Lebanon. She said that at the beginning of the war in Lebanon, Syria emerged as a basic party and it has also been the most difficult in terms of understanding because of the proliferation of its apparent orientation and the numerous changes in its alliances. Syrian strategy, which sometimes has suffered losses (1982) and sometimes success (1984), is difficult to place in analytical categories. In spite of that, President Hafiz al-Asad follows goals which can be enumerated as follows:

The country's official regime and the Ba'th's aspirations toward Arab unity.

The history of the country, which has the heritage of the nation of the Ottoman Levant.

Political geographic considerations connected to the Syrian-Israeli line of confrontation.

Syria seeks the unification of the Lebanese-Syrian nation (the people) while respecting the existence of two independent countries (the state), and has the goal of containing Israeli political and military influence in Lebanon as long as strategic parity with Israel is absent.

Dr Picard concluded her study by pointing out that Syria has faced serious difficulties in Lebanon in its attempts to strengthen its sovereignty. In spite of the collapse of the state, the Lebanese factional system is still flexible to an extent which inspires amazement. In spite of the military loss the Palestine Liberation Organization has suffered, it remains an important party in the Lebanese

game, although President al-Asad has fallen into the snare of the many hostilities his regime has triggered since the beginning of the war without intelligent consideration and Israel has not left him any opportunity to contain the Iranian and extremist groups which are now challenging him on the Lebanese stage.

Israeli Strategy

Dr Bill Harris concluded the conference with a study on Israeli strategy in Lebanon and said, "The basic phenomenon of Israeli policy toward Lebanon since the Israeli military redeployment in 1985 has been the reduction of Lebanon's significance in Israel's regional outlook. This is connected to a change in the Israeli strategic balance, which has shifted from direct intervention at the center of the Lebanese stage (1981-1984) to a holding operation in the south, along with the pursuit of an indirect platform in other areas (after 1985)."

Dr Harris went on to say, "Israel's current position at times superficially resembles its position in the period before 1981, but the lessons of the years of direct intervention mean that its current position entails greater strategic restraints and a more thorough reading of Lebanese realities."

Dr Harris concluded his lecture by talking about the interconnection between the Israeli style and the Syrian, Iranian and Palestinian movements, and the repercussions of that on the various local Lebanese factors.

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Debate on Islamic Condition Defines Enemy, Objective

44040172c Beirut AL-'AHD in Arabic 4 Mar 88 p 12

[Text] On the occasion of resistance week, Student Mobilization-Hizballah organized a political discussion in the Media and Documentation Faculty, the first branch, under the title "The Islamic Resistance: Its Premises, Goals and Relations with Outsiders."

The discussion was with Mr Ibrahim al-Amin.

The three people carrying on the discussion were faculty professors: Dr Muhammad Michel Ghurayyib, Dr Talal 'Alamah and Dr Ghassan Badr-al-Din.

The discussion dealt with the Islamic resistance: cause and slogan, content and method, strategy and tactics, plan and phases of application, and other sections which provided specific details and eliminated some of the obscurity from others' vision.

The First Presentation

The first presentation was that of Dr Muhammad Michel Ghurayyib, who directed the discussion and in it offered a clear vision of Islamic resistance which covered every

Lebanese and Arab form of resistance, its basic premises and the legitimacy of the holy Koran and the noble sayings and doings of the prophet. For this reason the premise of the Islamic resistance is a religious one, one of faith, and is consequently a religious obligation on other Moslems.

Dr Ghurayyib reminded the fighting men of the Islamic resistance of "the goals which they must keep their attention fastened on, which is not to restrict our resistance to Israel; rather, it must go beyond that to the Zionist, American and Western aggressors supporting Israel."

The Second Presentation

Mr Ibrahim al-Amin, in the second presentation, considered the Islamic resistance "the second stage in the emergence of peoples in the Middle East region. The first emergence was in the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the third is the revolution of the Moslems in occupied Palestine."

However, Mr al-Amin considered, in his presentation, that this resistance so far had not effected a change in geography and was still functioning in an existing international geography, which was where the problem was.

Mr al-Amin said, "The question of effecting a change in geography must begin, and it has been achieved in the Iran of Islam. In Lebanon and Palestine, however, so far it has not been realized, although it has changed many political equations and balances of power."

Mr al-Amin presented the resistance with a very great task, which is that of continuing to form the movement of Moslem man everywhere so that the movement of the Moslems would be united in fighting pagans.

The Third Presentation

In the third presentation, Dr Talal 'Alamah spoke about the position of Islamic law which "alone is what gets us moving on the stage, after having been the leading guide in the teachings of the prophets and the proselytizers."

He said, "Resistance is an old, self-renewing subject which the prophets began and the scholars, our leaders who bear legitimate responsibility, have continued. The Moslems in Lebanon benefited from this and shifted the resistance from one of religious scholars to a forthright current of the people in all the countries of the Moslems. Here the question which presents itself is, What is the Islamic resistance's plan?"

Mr Ibrahim al-Amin replied, "The Islamic resistance does not entail a plan in the sense of political parties, and it is not a party, not an army and not a group of people who are available to work full time. The resistance has succeeded in forming the nation's movement in Lebanon on the basis of Islam as an intellectual and conceptual

notion of struggle. On this basis, the resistance is not fighting an aggressive force of occupation in the south, but has been fighting a historic enemy since the Moslems came into being, which is a central enemy which has as its target all the peoples of the region, the West and the world.

"The resistance has clearly articulated its enemy. When we propound the liberation of Jerusalem we are not free in how we do it, because we are faced with a belief before which we do not possess a choice or lack of choice, and this is the issue which gives the resistance a *raison d'être*, because it is the focus of conflict and difference even among the parties on the inside."

Mr al-Amin stressed "Whoever seeks the liberation of Jerusalem has to keep the stage of struggle with Israel open, not enter into direct or indirect negotiations, not sign a truce agreement and not accept security arrangements or Resolution 425. Whoever seeks the liberation of Jerusalem must consider Israel an enemy, not an occupying force, and we are not fighting it for the sake of the liberation of the south. This is not the issue. The only issue as far as we are concerned goes by the name 'the liberation of Jerusalem,' and that has made the south the arena of a struggle which is defeating Israel.

"However, do the political issue of Lebanon, the settlement, plans and agreements contribute to the liberation of Jerusalem? We are not discussing the number of Shiites in government positions or the number of Sunnites. We are not discussing the Council of Ministers of the president, but we are working for the sake of Palestine, and here the question is, are we working for the sake of the liberation of Jerusalem or not?

"Are we settling the borders with Israel or not? Whoever wants to liberate Jerusalem must not accept security arrangements with the enemy. After 20 years he may not be able to defeat Israel but he will be able to avoid signing any security agreements with it."

The Fourth Presentation

As to the fourth presentation, that was by Dr Ghassan Badr-al-Din, who said:

"We are not here to applaud the Islamic resistance. It does not need applause. However, there are questions, some of which have been raised, such as the Islamic resistance's plan and the question of alliances. A third question has been added on the dimensions of the Islamic resistance outside the Lebanese borders, which leads to the distinction between strategy and tactics. If we seek the liberation of Jerusalem as a strategic goal, can we today, in the current international circumstances, and the existing criteria [sic] of forces, specify the strategic objective, or are numerous strategies necessary in order to arrive at the major strategy, in the sense of whether there is a conception of tentative action? If the Islamic resistance seeks the liberation of Palestine and

the establishment of the Islamic state, do objective circumstances and balances of forces exist which will permit the realization of that, or can the Islamic resistance break that down into stages? How will the alliances in the process of these stages be? Because each stage is not governed by a single type of alliance."

Mr Amin: On the subject of strategy and tactics, all the Arabs' tactics since 1948 have become strategy. They are tacticians in their strategy. This tactic brought them to the Fez conference, the international conference and the government in exile, and Hassan the Second's status as head of the Jerusalem committee means that he is a strategist, but his reception of Zionists has become tactics, and the same with 'Arafat. Husayn is the strategist whose tactics brought him to the killing of Palestinians in Black September. Some years ago the Arabs' strategy was the non-recognition and elimination of Israel. However, with tactics, things have come down to an agreement between the organization and Israel to eliminate the armed struggle, and thus tactics have eliminated the cause.

Mr Amin observed an existing discrepancy between tactics and strategy. The Palestinians in the occupied territories were hitting the Israelis with stones, not bullets, which were tactics, and they were making confrontation on the streets, not in guerrilla bands, which were tactics. In Lebanon we were bombarding Israel from the liberated territories or not bombarding it, and these were tactics also. However, if we struck and bombarded Israel on the basis of whether or not to eliminate Israel, that is a matter which concerned us, we who determined our tactics and struck or did not strike without telling Israel, "we want that or do not want it."

Mr al-Amin cited a number of questions whose answers were inherent within themselves. These included:

Is giving Israel security arrangements tactics? At whose expense?

Is ending the problem of the struggle with Israel tactics? At the expense of what?

Is the siege of Moslems in Lebanon to turn them into people whose mission is over tactics?

Mr al-Amin specified, "Tactics are acceptable if they do not lead to recognition of Israel," stressing "We will not sign any agreement whose meaning is recognition of Israel. This means continuing the struggle with it. We can or cannot, we will continue or not continue this matter which interests us, fight it with an army, with bands, with a people, be silent—these are objective things which we stipulate, and they are not stipulated by agreement with Israel. These are tactics, and the truce agreement was not signed by two enemies, because there was no struggle between Lebanon and Israel. Also there was 17 May."

Dr Badr-al-Din: The truce was not a recognition of Israel.

Mr al-Amin: The truce was abrogated on the international level because Israel carried out all forms of aggression against Lebanon—unless the Lebanese regime considered the Moslems in the south not to be Lebanese!

We as a people are not bound by any international resolutions, because the regime which signed them is not this nation's regime, same as al-Sadat's regime and the Camp David agreement.

He added, "The most minor aspect of the truce agreement was that the struggle with Israel was halted and proof of that has been the Lebanese regime's position regarding Israel since it."

Dr Badr-al-Din: In order for me to become strong I must change the regime I do not recognize so my back can be protected. Is our struggle now to liberate Jerusalem or change the Lebanese regime and all Arab regimes?

Mr al-Amin: Most objectively, I can say that the focus of the struggle in the region is Israel. Bringing down regimes might be an important part of arriving at that focal point. The Islamic revolution in Iran has given a big basic impetus in this direction. With respect to Lebanon, however, the issue is very complex. The regime relies on Israel for its survival and continuation, and therefore whoever fights Israel from Lebanon is bringing down all the regimes in the region, including the Lebanese regime. The struggle now is between a people who are rebelling against Israel and regimes on Israel's side, because its existence has become a guarantee of the existence of these regimes.

The magnitude of the holy struggle which has taken place in Lebanon since 1982 has been defeating the most powerful regime in the world, but in spite of that everything has collapsed and the regime has survived. Here we are stressing the continuity of the struggle with Israel and the continuity of the stand in the domestic arena to prevent the major countries from carrying out their plans in Lebanon. As far as bringing down this regime goes, we want to bring it down, but it is protected not just by foreign countries but also from within, by factions, entities, parties, intelligence agencies and money. If we were to go beyond our struggle with Israel to bring down the regime, nothing might be left.

Mr al-Amin concluded: "The Islamic resistance is the plan to make the nation stand on its feet in Lebanon and when innate and international balances of power make it possible, this regime must fall."

Amman Conference Discusses Rebuilding of Nation

44040172a Beirut AL-IQTISAD WAL-A'MAL
Mar 88 pp 47-49

[Text] What have been the direct and indirect effects of the Lebanese war, which has going on for more than 12 years, on Lebanese society? How have conditions in the Lebanese household changed? What are the results of the population rearrangement which Lebanese society has witnessed following the migrations and uprootings citizens of various creeds in the various areas have been subjected to?

These are some of the subjects addressed by the symposium on the social and economic dimensions of the Lebanese crisis held in Amman and organized by the Society of Arab Thought. The symposium also dealt with economic dimensions in their various manifestations, especially those of finance and banking.

Here are the most prominent proceedings of the symposium:

At the beginning of last February the Society of Arab Thought (whose headquarters are Amman) organized a symposium on the social and economic dimensions of the Lebanese crisis. Jordan's crown prince, Prince al-Hasan, opened it with a statement which the chairman of the royal Jordanian committee for Jerusalem affairs, Mr Akram Zu'aytar, delivered in his place. In it he mentioned that the Lebanese felt that the Arabs' support for them during their tragedy had not measured up to the duties called for by Arab solidarity and pointed out that the people of Lebanon were not the only victims of the frail nature of Arab solidarity and the flareup of disputes among brothers. He stressed that the war of Lebanon would be nearing an end in the near future and that Lebanon was headed toward prosperity and a renewed brilliance.

The prince's statement also said "We in the society know the serious nature of the political factors behind the outbreak of the Lebanese war, and we are aware of its importance in the attainment of peace. However, at the beginning we preferred to understand the economic and social elements and think about means which would lead to the rectification of those. We Arabs have a lesson from the war of Lebanon from which we should draw a warning concerning the government's mission vis-a-vis society. If we all agree that government, which is a comprehensive legitimate power whose task is to control social interactions, is an inevitable necessity for national peace, we must think deeply about the characteristics of the most virtuous government, because a government that is absent, or one which the forces of the society are putting on the sidelines, is one which has become alienated from its *raison d'être* and will soon foretell the outbreak of conflicts in the society. Therefore we must then seek a contract between the government and the society and an important, creative balance at the same

time in which the government will constitute a wall for society, a means of control and an instrument of development. Our conviction is that the tragedy of Lebanon drives us all to an unremitting search for this delicate balance between government and society which most of the time is lacking."

Migration and Uprooting

The proceedings of the symposium continued for four sessions in which working papers were presented on overall economic and social conditions in Lebanon. Dr Jean Yusuf Murad presented his paper on "Migration and Uprooting in Lebanon" at the first session, which was headed by the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr 'Abdallah Bisharah.

Dr Murad addressed the problem of uprooting and the rearrangement of the population in Lebanon, where the features of the population have changed and more than half the Lebanese have been subjected to uprooting in Beirut, the mountains, the south and the al-Biqā' in continuous stages for about 13 years. The uprooted have become statistics and data in the files of political and social organizations.

The Lebanese Family in the Context of the War

Dr Huda Zurayq presented a working paper on the effect of the war on the integrity of the family through a field study carried out on a random sample of families in West Beirut. The study showed that psychological symptoms have been the most prominent effect of the war on Lebanese families, since people's suffering has assumed the manifestations of elements of nervousness, forgetfulness, sorrow, loneliness, insomnia, fatigue and the inability to concentrate or make decisions easily.

In his turn, Dr Zuhayr Hatab talked in his paper about the effects of the war on the structure and functions of the Lebanese family and dealt with a number of issues such as the conditions of society before the war. These conditions had realized progress as far as the structure of the family was concerned until the new conditions of the war arose, contributing to social change.

Educational and Cultural Conditions

In the second working session, which Dr Mahmud Riyad, former secretary general of the League of Arab States, headed, Dr Munir Bashur presented a working paper on the deterioration of the Lebanese educational system in which he pointed out that factional fanaticism had worked to segregate education, in the name of cultural pluralism, on the pretext of the various factions' characteristics of religion, civilization, society and culture, and the culture of decadence prevailed, all of this helping Lebanon enter into the era of militias and the collapse of the state.

Dr Ahmad Baydun then presented his paper on the cultures of the war and postwar culture, in which he pointed out that Arabhood to the Lebanese was their own Arabhood, as individuals, and the Arabhood of a given Arab people, that is, that it proceeded from the person to the nation without an intermediary. As to the Arabhood of Lebanon, that was posited in name but was held in abeyance in terms of actual significance.

Dr Radwan al-Sayyid presented a paper titled "The Model of Lebanese Identity in Confrontation with Arab Islamic Identity," and the new secretary general of the Society of Arab Thought, Dr Ghassan Salamah, presented a paper titled "The War, Thorough Interpretations of It, and Ways of Emerging from It."

Financial and Banking Conditions

Dr Ilyas Saba presented a working paper on financial and banking matters, whose most prominent contents were:

The Lebanese economic system is a free system but it entails many excesses and lacks the rules necessary for a free system. It has been closer to chaos and permissiveness than to freedom in the modern sense.

The most important characteristics of this system are:

1. The weakness and absence of government's role with respect to correcting general trends, providing a forward impetus, justice in distribution and stability.
2. The grant of permanent legitimacy to and predominance of private property, individual initiative and economic freedom in a manner which has resulted in the dominance by economic power centers of political and economic decisionmaking.
3. The dominant character of services and trade and the mentality of the deal.
4. The administration of government affairs by the notions and standards of the private sector and weakness in discriminating among costs, private returns and public returns.
5. The growth of the city, the capital, and its thorough absorption of the domestic economy.
6. Poor income distribution and an absence of equality of opportunity among individuals and groups.
7. The dominant role of the foreign sector and exposure of the Lebanese economy to the outer world, with serious subordination to the outer world.

However, the Lebanese system has had some positive features and achievements. It has created welfare in economic terms, growth in the level of income, consumption and investment and improvement in the quality of life.

As to the banking sector, that has been the most perseverant of sectors—indeed, it has flourished and grown and its profits have increased. It has benefitted from the difficult circumstances and the climate of inflation.

With respect to the treasury deficit, the average monthly deficit was 600 million pounds during the years 1981-83; this rose to 1.8 billion in 1985 and 2.4 billion in 1986 and came to 5.8 billion a month in the first half of 1987. It may have exceeded 12 billion a month in the final quarter of 1987.

Dr Saba refused to justify this lax performance by what has been said on modifying the deficit figures in accordance with inflation, because the deficit has been the cause behind inflation. He also rejected the revaluation of gold and foreign currencies; they have represented income for the treasury which has permitted spending and cover for the deteriorating conditions.

Dr Saba considered that the roots of the economic crisis in Lebanon go back before the war, and instead of belt-tightening by the government in the face of the negative developments, the opposite is what has happened, and the government has proceeded to spend without account.

The high inflation has proceeded to inflict harm on the private sector, creating the illegal parallel economy.

He considered that it was not out of the question to bring Lebanon out of its economic crisis and that the problem was attributable not to economic or social backwardness or poverty but to mismanagement and poor leadership.

Economic and Social Conditions

Dr Kamal Hamdan presented a paper on the development of economic and social conditions in the context of the war, stating "The Lebanese economy in the past 10 years of war has witnessed a superficial prosperity. The rates of growth have inspired amazement, the foreign currency reserve has increased rapidly and the Lebanese pound has enjoyed an exchange rate of increasing value. However, behind that have lain great monopolies and poor distribution of wealth, and income tax collection has not amounted to 9 percent of the general budget. The process of the rearrangement of society has occurred in the direction of new forms of balance and classes transcending and passing beyond factions. The breakout of civil war has not been separate from the aggravation of the social crisis, and it is not true that the war has been the offspring of foreign, Arab and Palestinian influences only. The internal political and social structure was waiting and ready for a direct cause."

Dr Hamdan moved over to the development of economic and social conditions in the context of the war, which are hard to observe because of the lack of availability of statistics and the proliferation of stages the war has passed through. In the area of war losses, these are estimated to have ranged from 22 to 28 billion pounds in 1974 prices in 1975 and 1976 alone.

There has been a negative growth rate of 3.8 percent a year, since income in 1982 equalled 73 percent of what it was in 1974, or declined by 77.2 percent from what it would have been expected to reach had it not been for the war. 1985 income has been estimated at about 60 percent of 1974 income in fixed prices.

Shifts occurred in the socioeconomic structure in light of the war. The roles of economic mediation between the Arab hinterland and the world market went into abeyance, the bulwarks of the service sector, such as transit and tourist activity, were disrupted, the productive sectors experienced a decline (perhaps with the exception of agriculture), the transfer of local factors of production out of the country accelerated, the structure of the private sector changed in the direction of the external economy, there was a decline in government revenues and government production of services and development and sweeping inflation occurred, since the rate of inflation rose to 30 percent in 1984, 70 percent in 1985, 162 percent in 1986 and 700 percent in 1987. The inflation and collapse of the currency led to the acceleration of the polarization of wealth in the hands of a number of beneficiaries, especially in the banking system, which was adept at speculating against the pound and realized great gains at the expense of depositors and white collar workers, who paid the bill for inflation.

With respect to the future, there are three possibilities:

1. The possibility that the deterioration of the political situation will continue and the breakdown into cantons will be sanctified, which will entail the economic and political suicide of the country.
2. The revival of the factional settlement among the various bourgeois parties in their factional and social groups through mutual concessions which will prevent the establishment of a government with a developmental role.
3. The occurrence of an enlightened bourgeois revolution whose interests are connected to the survival of the nation and which would transcend key traditional political and factional figures to perform a political, economic and social reform.

The tipping of the balance in favor of one of these possibilities will depend on the outcome the current struggles reach. In the long term, the existence of the liberal bourgeoisie will be subject to frustration and annihilation as a result of structural changes of a new kind whose direction cannot be controlled as of now.

The Concluding Session

The concluding session was chaired by Prince al-Hasan. In it he talked about the future of Lebanon and considered that the coming summer would witness a transitional stage in Lebanon and not a new way-station in the war, which the Lebanese have suffered from greatly. He called on the Lebanese to build a pluralistic bulwark of civilization which could in numerous sovereign Arab countries constitute the foundations for the effort to grant further freedoms and responsibilities to classes of the society in a different form. He underlined the importance of acknowledging dissident views and their right to be heard.

Recommendations

Bishop Gregoire Haddad read out the recommendations of the symposium. The people taking part considered that their mere coming together from various areas of Lebanon and their interaction, and the participation of Arab intellectuals in this symposium, constituted a great achievement. Therefore, lest the valid work of the symposium be wasted, agreement was reached on forming followup committees to complete the discussion and arrive at scientific social, economic, developmental and political conclusions.

The people attending the symposium implored international and Arab bodies concerned with the rebuilding of Lebanon to take part in the various areas of reconstruction and asked the society to take the measures that it considered appropriate to receive the desired support.

The Lebanese participants recorded thanks and appreciation to the board of secretaries in the Society of Arab Thought for choosing a Lebanese, Dr Ghassan Salamah, as secretary general of the society.

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OMAN

Chairman Discusses Role of Advisory Council

44040181b Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic
16 Mar 88 p 17

[Interview with Shaykh 'Abdallah bin-'Ali al-Qatabi, chairman of the Omani Advisory Council, by Nabil Fahmi and Ahmad Nafadi; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] What role does the Advisory Council perform in the sultanate? How do you see the importance of this role in the important stage we are now experiencing?

[Answer] Decree 81/84 of the sultan, which established the State Advisory Council, defined the council's goals as contributing advice concerning the country's economic

and social development. The council does this by exercising a number of powers that the decree lodged in it. These can be summarized as follows:

1. Expressing opinion on the economic and social laws in force in the sultanate, and advising on their improvement to keep pace with emerging requirements of development.
2. Expressing opinion on subjects that Sultan Qabus thinks should be submitted to the council.
3. Expressing opinion on any general policy the government submits for consideration, and giving a recommendation in order to render impending plans and legislation complete.
4. Recommending necessary measures to be taken in development areas with which the government has not yet dealt.
5. Studying bottlenecks faced by the private sector, and recommending ways to remedy them within the limits of the country's available resources.

On this basis, as Sultan Qabus stated in his speech of 3 November 1981 on the occasion of the inauguration of the council, the State Advisory Council is "a vital area for the interaction and integration of ideas and for full cooperation between government and citizens in the tasks and duties that engage us during the present stage of development."

The importance of the council's role at this stage stems from the importance of present economic and social changes in our lives and possible future changes. In the last 17 years of its history, our country has witnessed tremendous development involving all aspects of life, and growth and prosperity extending to all its regions. As life develops and becomes more complex, the need increases for more ideas and consultation and for more cooperation and integration between different government agencies as regards planning for economic and social development; hence the importance of the council, and hence its role in expressing opinion in its capacity as a consultative body bringing together experienced and talented representatives. The council thus has the opportunity to submit recommendations that reflect the requirements and wishes of Omani citizens in different regions and places, thereby helping relevant government agencies appropriately confront the requirements of development.

[Question] What are the areas of coordination and cooperation between the sultanate's Advisory Council and other similar councils in the GCC countries? Are there exchanges of delegations, visits, and experience, and coordination in legislation, laws, and other areas?

[Answer] As you know, the State Advisory Council is still young, having begun to carry out its responsibilities early in 1982. In spite of its newness and the many responsibilities entrusted to it during the last 6 years, the council has not neglected the important area of contacts with other councils in the fraternal GCC countries in order to exchange ideas and experience in the various areas in which these councils operate. In response to an invitation from the president of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, a council delegation visited Kuwait in March 1984 and studied the Kuwaiti experience in this area. Returning this visit, a delegation from the Kuwait National Assembly, headed by the speaker of parliament, visited Oman in September 1985. The delegation had the honor of meeting Sultan Qabus and became acquainted with Oman's experience with the principle of "shura" (Islamic consultation) on which the State Advisory Council bases its work. Naturally, we desire more exchanges of visits, delegations, and experience with our brothers in similar councils in the GCC countries. God willing, we will work to realize this in coming years.

[Question] What have been the Advisory Council's most prominent achievements in the past years? What are the most important problems in which the council has had a clear role?

[Answer] The State Advisory Council has had a prominent role since its creation. It has carried out many studies related to economic and social areas. It has offered recommendations and suggestions that have helped the government implement its development projects to serve the citizens in all regions. The recommendations submitted to Sultan Qabus have won praise and approval. They have received the consideration they merit from his wise government's ministries and responsible agencies. The council's recommendations have aimed at improving and extending health and education services, road and electrical services, postal and telephone services, and municipal and other services. Because of the government's interest, these services now cover all regions of the sultanate. In its future studies, the council will follow a path that balances the citizens' requirements and the country's available resources as relates to just distribution of services in all regions.

[Question] The Sultanate of Oman has good relations with the nations of the world, based on the principle of cooperation and friendship. How do you see the State Advisory Council's role in strengthening relations with other nations of the world?

[Answer] The State Advisory Council's role in strengthening relations with the various countries of the world complements the role of the Omani government's other official agencies which work to create and cement relations with all countries of the world in a framework of cooperation, friendship, and mutual respect, in accordance with the wise policy outlined by Sultan Qabus in this regard. Starting from this concept, the council's role in strengthening relations with fraternal and friendly

countries concentrates basically on the exchange of experience and knowledge between the State Advisory Council and similar advisory councils and official agencies in those countries, thereby realizing greater understanding and cooperation between Oman and the other countries of the world.

[Question] What are your ideas on strengthening the system of "shura" (Islamic consultation) and developing the State Advisory Council's positive role in the various aspects of Omani life? Can one say that the council in its new session will apply a new method or follow a path different from the one followed in its previous sessions?

[Answer] The system of "shura" on the basis of which the State Advisory Council was established and in accordance with which it exercises its responsibilities and powers is rooted in the principle of "shura" in our Islamic religion—"Those who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation [Shura]" (Qur'an 42:38)—and in authentic Omani traditions handed down through history. Perhaps the strongest proof of the breadth of council participation in the various aspects of Omani life was what Sultan Qabus bin-Sa'id said in his 3 November 1981 speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the State Advisory Council: "In entrusting your council with the task of expressing opinion and counsel on the country's general economic and social policy, we desire the council to be a framework for joint effort between the government and popular sector. It will study the goals and dimensions of our development plans, the priorities set for their projects, the obstacles that may impede implementation of these plans, and the appropriate solutions for these obstacles. Our desire therefore was to represent both the government and the popular sector in this council, with the popular representation having a majority among the members who represent different regions. In this way, the council will be equal to the noble goal for which it was established: to consider the desires and needs of the citizens while outlining our national policy in the economic and social areas."

There is thus no need for us at the present time to follow a new method or path for the council's work in its new session, because the Sultan's edicts that currently regulate the council's method of operation satisfy all the requirements that enable the council to perform its mission in the best manner. This as regards the method of operation; as for the subjects, they will vary with the varying economic and social needs of the society.

[Question] What are the most prominent Omani problems on which the State Advisory Council will concentrate during its current session?

[Answer] In his speech opening the council's fourth session, Sultan Qabus dealt with a number of extremely important high-priority problems that, taken together,

will form the council's agenda for the coming 2 years. These problems, which the council's various committees have in fact begun to study, can be summarized as follows:

Agriculture: The council's study in the area of agriculture will concentrate on aspects mentioned in the speech: developing agriculture in accordance with practical and realistic methods that will assist in achieving the greatest possible degree of self-sufficiency in food products; working to increase the area under cultivation; reviewing the current system of agricultural marketing so as to serve the farmer and the consumer; continuing government support for farmers; optimal exploitation of water resources; encouraging citizens to persist in agricultural vocations; and self-reliance.

Fisheries: The council's study of this subject will deal with broadest citizen participation in the Oman Fish Company that Sultan Qabus ordered established to exploit the country's fisheries; offering the required assistance to professional fishermen and creating outlets for marketing their products; defining the fishing zones of the Oman Fish Company so that it does not compete with traditional fishermen; and encouraging citizens to work in the fishing profession, which has been a traditional profession of Omanis since ancient times.

The private sector: The council's study of this subject will deal with means of stimulating the private sector to embark upon industrial projects, especially those based on local raw materials and that satisfy the requirements of the basic Omani market. It will also work to reinvigorate traditional crafts and professions, preserving them as a cultural heritage and as an economic resource for those who engage in them.

Providing employment for the national work force: The council's study in this area will aim at laying new foundations for regulating the employment of the national work force in the private and government sectors, thus leading to the gradual substitution of local for guest workers. It will also aim at developing education and training policies in the civil service and at encouraging young people to roll up their sleeves and engage in work in all areas.

Development programs: In addition to the problems I have indicated, the council will be asked to contribute advice and counsel on ordering development priorities for this period and the coming one, thus helping establish long-range programs for the balanced development of all regions of the country.

SUDAN

Southern Rebels Admit Incarceration of Carabino Kwang

45000065 Khartoum AL-RAYAH in Arabic
10 Apr 88 p 1

[Report by Majid Yusuf in Addis Ababa]

[Text] The popular movement [Sudanese People's Liberation Movement], which is led by John Garang, has admitted for the first time that it is keeping Major Carabino Kwang, member of the movement's supreme command and its deputy commander in chief, under protective custody. Major Joseph Koah, member of the movement's supreme command, affirmed this to AL-RAYAH during his talk with us in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.

Maj Koah said that the movement took these steps after it unexpectedly heard Carabino take some positions which it characterized as racist and disrespectful of the elected leadership of the movement, and as an attempt to split it and destroy it.

Koah explained that [the SPLM's] information had confirmed that contacts had been made between the incarcerated major (Carabino) and some Sudanese Government elements, and that near agreement had been concluded on carrying out some of their plans, but that [the movement] had thwarted them.

This came out during the extended meeting which AL-RAYAH conducted with Maj Joseph Kawah and which will be published in the next few days.

AL-RAYAH points out that Maj Carabino was conducting secret talks in London with Major General (Retired) Fadlallah Burmah Nasir, the minister of state for defense.

Carabino Kwang is considered the real commander of the rebel movement at its inception by virtue of his responsibility for the 104th Battalion, which began the rebellion in the city of Bor.

AL-RAYAH adds that the real reason for this arrest is Carabino's objection to the marginalization which the rebel movement command has extended to him, which motivated him to demand that the movement leadership be entrusted to him due to his affiliation with the Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka tribe, a numerical majority among the combat troops of the movement.

TUNISIA

ATCT Director Describes Important Role of Cooperants

45190046a Tunis LE RENOUVEAU in French
22 Mar 88 p 3

[Interview with Hamed Zghal, director general of the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation, by Samira Ghannouchi; date and place not given]

[Text] Following the cooperation undertaken in the commercial, industrial and cultural realms, we now see that technical cooperation is necessary, because of its conclusive results and the substantial contribution it can make to the national economy.

About 2,000 cooperants sent to various parts of the globe every year, and more than 30 million dinars annually in foreign-exchange income—these indicators describe a sector which is prospering.

We asked Hamed Zghal, director general of the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation, to give us its general outlines, in order to clarify certain aspects of this cooperation.

[Question] What is the level of cooperation between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, and what are its prospects, in particular since the recent visit paid to the Wahabite Kingdom by President Ben Ali?

[Answer] Our experience with Saudi Arabia in the technical cooperation field is quite recent.

Although it dates back 6 years, we have only recently been able to dynamize this activity.

We have only been operating in Saudi Arabia for a short time. The scenario there already involved Western, Asiatic and even Arab cadres.

And so, from a level which was near zero in 1981, we have progressed to the point of having 4,372 cooperants in Saudi Arabia currently. The most recent visit paid by President Ben Ali to the Wahabite Kingdom cannot fail to give a new qualitative impetus to the excellent relations existing between the two countries, on the one hand, and the known value, which has been confirmed in the field, of the Tunisian cadres, on the other. Moreover, the excellent reputation they enjoy must not be overlooked.

Saudi Arabia has expressed its desire to intensify bilateral cooperation with Tunisia. And from the outset, I have been convinced that the flow of our cadres toward Saudi Arabia would increase, particularly in the health, education and electricity sectors. And we can assign about 2,000 new cooperants there every year. With this

prospect, we have now undertaken to teach English to candidates for assignment to Saudi Arabia. Intensive courses have already begun, and 350 individuals are enrolled.

During the month of March, 190 new cooperants will leave for Saudi Arabia.

[Question] What are our prospects on the Arab market?

[Answer] The Tunisian technical-cooperation strategy dates back to the 1960s. Launched jointly with the neighboring countries, Libya and Algeria, it has continued to this day with the latter. It took on greater scope during the following decade. In the past, we have cooperated with Morocco, and cooperation with Mauritania is continuing.

At the beginning of the 1980s, we had oriented our efforts toward Saudi Arabia, which enabled us to assess the Tunisian capacity in the Gulf countries.

At present we are directing our efforts toward sub-Saharan Africa. It is not without interest to note that cooperation with the African countries dates back to a distant era.

Zaire was the first country to profit from our cooperation, just after it won independence. This operation was financed, moreover, by the UN.

This cooperation was resumed 4 years ago with Cameroon, where Tunisian civil engineers are engaged, and with Gabon, where teachers are contributing to the educational effort in that country.

These countries have committed themselves to covering the general costs of the cadres working with them.

Where certain countries in Africa which have need of the competence of our cadres, but cannot bear the cost involved, are concerned, we have found it necessary to turn to international organizations for project financing. At the same time, we are pursuing two parallel kinds of action, both assessing and identifying the needs of the host countries and analyzing the national capacities which might meet the needs determined.

Our efforts do not end there. We must, in addition, find sources of subsidies for our cooperative actions by working with international financial institutions. It was in this way that we obtained the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).

Recently, the UNDP allocated a sum of about \$1.4 million to us to cover technical-cooperation expenses for the orientation of cadres and the training of African cadres in Tunisia.

This program is, moreover, a first on the international level.

[Question] Following the visit paid by the National Mauritanian Coordination Group to Tunisia, what bilateral projects are planned?

[Answer] Our cooperation with Mauritania began with the dispatch of teachers, who have carried out their task in the best possible way.

Satisfied with these results, the Mauritanian officials have asked for our help in various realms—education, data processing and training.

Thanks to the visit paid to Tunisia by the national coordinator of the planning program of the Mauritanian state administrative apparatus, other projects were developed. Emphasis was placed on this occasion on a study of the practical means of carrying out the institutional reform program. It will benefit from a financial contribution from the World Bank (\$10 million). The training of Mauritanian cadres who will take over the implementation of this project will also be stressed.

[Question] How do you view the future of technical cooperation?

[Answer] One never thinks of technical cooperation in terms of a bulwark of the national economy. Well, it is one! For cooperation alone accounts for foreign-exchange income which averages 30 million dinars a year. This figure exceeds the total for our exports of citrus fruits, for example, and even that of phosphates. This is to say that Tunisia is in the process of becoming a country of great human resources.

5157

Production Activities at El Borma Oilfield Described

45190046b Tunis LA PRESSE in French
20 Mar 88 p 11

[Article by Soufiane Ben Farhat: "El Borma—The Manna of the South"]

[Text] El Borma, a major deposit of commercial-quality Zarzaitine oil, extends over 160 sq km. The 130 producer and injector wells in Tunisia cover more than 75 percent of the deposit, 22 percent of which is being exploited by our Algerian brothers.

The first well was drilled in 1963. The Italian-Tunisian Oil Exploitation Company (SITEP) does most of the work, along with the CTF, the GTP, the STEG and the SODEPS.

This is veritable manna for the Tunisian South, where as the years have passed, the our national agents and cadres have entered into operation. Precisely what point has been reached?

The production of the SITEP in El Borma accounts for more than two thirds of our domestic crude-oil production. The deposit as a whole comes to a total of 208 million cubic meters. Normally, in terms of natural depletion, one cannot exceed a quarter of the deposit in production, which would mean 57 million cubic meters for El Borma.

However, the vast water-injection project which has been pursued for almost 10 years now by the SITEP has made it possible to exceed the international norms and to increase production substantially. The 40 million additional cubic meters which this makes available will bring final exploitation to 55 percent of the total in the year 2005, or 105 million cubic meters of crude oil.

Already, prior to 1988, 79.5 million cubic meters had been extracted. As the current annual production level is 3.8 million cubic meters, this is the equivalent of \$360 million (about 290 million dinars) at an average price of \$15 per barrel. Soon, the drilling of a deep well will be undertaken, because seismic surveys have identified a promising, if not yet certain, level. If the well in question demonstrates a certain capacity, the life of the El Borma deposit will not end in the year 2005 at all. In any case, as long as there is oil, there is hope.

Full Steam Ahead

Located deep in the sand dunes, 200 km from the Rmada station, the El Borma deposit represents manna for the southern Tunisian economy. In addition to supplying the national market, it makes a substantial contribution to exports. But it also involves a complex which provides jobs.

The SITEP alone employs 420 people. Of these, 171 come from the governorates of Medenine and Tataouine, not to mention the 20 occasional workers recruited periodically from the localities in the extreme southern part of the country and 59 other workers from the South. In other words, it is well and truly a project which contributes to correcting the regional imbalance.

Abdelwahab Mrabet, the director of the El Borma base, welcomed us to his purview like a general. After 20 years service in this sector, he has acquired a most detailed knowledge of the various gears of the imposing "mechanism" functioning there. We were just off the plane when an agent murmured to us, nodding his head in his direction: "You see that man? They call him the lion of the Sahara."

During the "proprietary tour" on which he took us, Mr Mrabet astonished us repeatedly with the depth and current nature of his knowledge. But as is true everywhere, one is only a good general if he is supported by a first-class general staff.

Whether it be at the production center, in the northern zone or at the production and injection points as such, the performance of the cadres, foremen and workmen leaps to the eye. Workers who come from all parts of the republic, cadres with degrees from the university in Tunis (but also from universities in Belgium, Algeria and the USSR) all seemed imbued with the same passionate desire to plumb the depths and to supply Tunisia with oil.

When one realizes that the several hundred Tunisians who work in El Borma must put up with isolation, torrid heat and the Saharan cold...and that they are nonetheless accounting for a large part of the supply for our fellow citizens, one is inevitably moved. And in addition, as the years have passed, the SITEP has become 100 percent Tunisian.

These Tunisians Are Gifted

The "North Zone" is the second major achievement of the El Borma complex, and was completed after the oil center (a production center which sees to the collection, storage and dispatch of the oil into the pipes which take it to the port of Skhira).

Tunisian engineers are working there. They showed us the computerized maintenance system, the first stage of which they have perfected. This system, the only one of its kind, makes optimal and preventive management of the various components of maintenance possible at low cost. All of the wells and the production center benefit from it. Messrs Maggouri and Bouraoui (young engineers) told us about it with pride. And with reason, moreover, particularly since their work methods meet high quality standards. It seems that the Italians are following this undertaking closely, clearly hoping to do something similar if this is successful.

Mr Chaabouni, for his part, is concerned with foreign-exchange economies. While explaining to us how the workshop for the repair of used parts which he heads operates, he emphasized the benefits our entire economy is deriving from it.

Various specialized shops deal with rotating machinery, nondestructive inspection (using X-ray, ultrasound and vibration techniques), and many other things as well.

Again in the North Zone, the gas-powered thermal power plant built by the SITEP together with the STEG is among the major achievements. Three 40-megawatt gas turbines supply the whole El Borma perimeter.

Young Bouraoui (a state engineer) was eager to show us the telemetry system recently perfected. It is a computerized center which maintains a check, around the clock, on the operations at the wells where pumping is in progress. One can call up information at any time of day or night, and in less than 2 minutes, precise data is provided on the load and pressure at each well, even those 40 km away.

Whenever there is a problem, an instant warning is issued. Its control and signaling functions are automatic.

During the morning of 16 March, there was a problem at well B 64. A connecting link had broken, and the pump fell. It was found jammed up against a cable at the bottom of the well. An engineer who spent the night at the well to begin repair work assured us that the damage was due to corrosion. This is a scourge at El Borma (but less so than at other oilfields). This problem arises because of the salinity and the presence of CO₂ there.

To deal with it, liquids which inhibit corrosion have been injected for the past 2 years. The control and supervision program is 100 percent Tunisian.

These are but a few examples. In the cafes, we met individuals who sometimes "camp out" between two daily assignments more than 60 km apart. Mr Ben Hmida, one of the veterans who has been employed in El Borma for 20 years, does his work in the area of the sand dunes. His task is to protect the pipeline which takes the crude oil to SP 4, and from there to Skhira, against damage from corrosion, oxidation and accidents.

Everywhere there is the same energy, but sometimes the faces reflect fatigue. In El Campo (the residential town), one sees family life in the evenings. Workers, foremen, cadres and the personnel of the service companies live side by side as families.

Mr Abdelwahab Mrabet likes to laugh. In between anecdotes, he sometimes lets himself lapse into lengthy meditation. A lion of the desert in his own fashion, he will tell you about the Italian who died in the Sahara while gathering gypsum flowers, or about the work of Mansour Aouidet, his faithful companion, who, it is said, knew the Sahara like his own backyard.

BANGLADESH

Indian Attitude on Refugee Problem Criticized

BK0105120788 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH

OBSERVER in English 25 Apr 88 p 5

[Editorial: "An Open Problem And Closed Minds"]

[Text] Bangladesh Government has protested in a recent statement against the Indian Government using its TV to telecast a documentary film based on facts which have no basis.

What is pretty unsettling is that the reported telecast tended to indulge in such an exaggeration of facts in which it is possible to detect intentions to unnecessarily complicate an issue that is in process of being sorted out through consensus between Bangladesh government and tribal leaders. Into the context fit also incidents like those of occasional raids by a force called Shanti Bahini on houses and families of innocent inhabitants in Chittagong Hill Tracts. The reported government-media activity or incidents of violence across the border run counter to the progress made in recently held negotiations between the representatives of two governments. And things looked quite encouraging with Bangladesh creating conditions for the Chakma refugees to return home and the Indian government pulling its weight to help complete the process of the refugees' return home and resettlement in their places.

This is not the first or lone instance of bilateral talks or initiatives between Bangladesh and India foundering on hidden unsuspected rocks. There are quite a few issues that have long lain unresolved between the two countries despite talks, exchange of data, experts' views etc. The issues are too well known to need repeating as well as the success that has always eluded the parties chasing it.

Treated as separate issues or incidents, these will keep blurring the vision and shut out the possibility of their being ever resolved. They have therefore to be pieced together and treated more as a symptom or syndrome of a malaise whose genesis lies in the long-troubled subcontinental history. This suggests a chronicity that needs to be properly diagnosed and the proper remedy found, if it is not too late to try it.

Before the two hundred years of British rule the subcontinent had known successive administrations by non-Indians for a pretty long time. At the height of it the problem of integration (under Akbar the Great) was sought to be solved in a fashion that reflected a genuine desire to remove once for all one of the fundamental causes of division between the two communities. But the answer contemplated by Akbar was too radical to work as a state policy. In fact it was unnecessary because the alien administrations at their best had pursued a state policy that offered equal treatment to all citizens irrespective of religion or caste. It was a tremendous

achievement considered historically against the background, that emerged during and following British rule, of communal tension leading to riots and ultimately in the division of India into Muslim and Hindu parts.

We have tried to condense in a few words a whole history of nearly 7-1w hundred years of muslim rule that witnessed almost a thoroughly unified India and of a later one of an India torn apart by hates and prejudices politically generated by vested interests in the administration (British) and subsequently exploited by communal leaders in India only to widen and deepen the chasm between the two major communities, Muslim and Hindu. Both during and after british rule no serious state-run policy (by the British eg.) or the Indian leadership was in place to bridge the chasm.

It is a pity that things remain much the same since, and have been responsible for the continuing tension sometime threatening to explode. That the same legacy of suspicion and mistrust, of ill-will and unhelpfulness should continue till today and that no one, particularly in the Indian leadership should be available to take it seriously is a commentary on the subcontinent's political wisdom. India had to its credit the great idea of communal harmony turned into a missionary struggle. But it miscarried, being more a moral campaign than a thorough-going political one.

Given the right political will a tension-free subcontinent is still feasible-if history has not come to a stand-still in our corner of the world

IRAN

Defense Officials Announce Domestic Production of Weapons

Defense Minister on Surface-to-Surface Missiles

46000133 Tehran KAYHAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic

16 Apr 88 p 3

[Excerpts] Brigadier General Mohammad Hoseyn Jalali has affirmed in a talk with journalists on the occasion of the beginning of soldiers' week Monday the role of the troops in preserving the unity of the land and the borders of the country. He said that the [regular] troops form the primary framework for the army and for part of the Islamic Revolution Guards. They are the ones who see actions through to their end.

He pointed out the production of missiles inside the country and said, "Some 80 percent of the missiles fired at Iraq have been Iranian made. Recently, two types of missiles with a range of 130 kilometers have been selected and intensive production will begin on them at the beginning of this month."

Brig Gen Jalali pointed to the production of the first 23-mm anti-aircraft gun, the flight of the first Iranian-made aircraft and the dedication of the first submarine

by the Iranian Navy. He described this as one aspect of the successes that have been achieved in the field of military industries, which are capable of repairing both military and commercial aircraft.

Air Force Commander on Weapons Industry
46000133 Tehran KAYHAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic
16 Apr 88 p 4

[Excerpt] Brigadier General Mohammad Hoseyn Jalali, minister of defense, and Brigadier General Mansur Sattari, commander of the Iranian Islamic Republic Army's air force, announced on a political talk show on television channel 2 Thursday afternoon the recent innovations in the defense industry in the field of producing fighter and bomber aircraft, different types of weapons, materiel, and surface-to-surface missiles.

Brig Gen Sattari pointed to the air force's excellent results in achieving self-sufficiency. He said that the first anti-aircraft gun made in the Islamic Republic had been tested before 22 Bahman [11 February 1988] and that it was being produced in great numbers. In addition to the manufacture of Presto transport aircraft, which was produced by contract specialists in the air force in less than 5 months, he affirmed that, "We are working on qualitative plans for three other types of aircraft, including a fighter-bomber. We are certain that this project will be crowned with success, and besides this, we will produce various types of anti-aircraft guns."

In connection with the successful testing of the Iranian-made surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of 130 kilometers, he said, "We have tested this missile and another with a much longer range. We will begin producing it in large numbers at the end of this month, God willing."

Brig Gen Jalali confirmed this and added that all of the missiles are made by the defense industry. He warned the worn-out Iraqi regime that, "We will pour an intensified fire on this regime soon."

He pointed out that, "We do not need foreigners to produce small-caliber ammunition for light weapons. We have reached 90 percent self-sufficiency."

He said, "We have achieved complete self-sufficiency in producing G-3 rifles. We will soon begin to produce Kalashnikov rifles and a weapon called Tender-9 [as published], of which we have produced a foreign version. We will announce the production of various types of machine guns in large numbers in 2 months, in addition to various types of artillery shells."

The minister of defense added that speed boats and pilotless aircraft have also been manufactured to be used in attacks on enemy targets at sea and to take photographs of enemy positions at the front. He stated that the cost of these types of weapons is 1/30 that of their foreign-made counterparts.

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